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I. INTRODUCTION: THE GLOBALIZATION OF THE PRACTICE OF
MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM
Constitutional interpretation across the globe is taking on an increasingly
cosmopolitan character, as comparative jurisprudence comes to assume a central
place in constitutional adjudication. Indeed, American constitutional practice, still
reflecting the view expressed by Justice Scalia that "comparative analysis [is]
inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution,"' is out of step with the
international mainstream. Extensive and detailed treatments of foreign materials
have become familiar features of constitutional adjudication in many courts outside
of the United States, most prominently the Constitutional Court of South Africa and
the Supreme Court of Canada. Comparative case law, however, does not only figure
prominently in judicial decisions; it also permeates constitutional argument and
academic commentary.
1. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) (dismissing the relevance of
comparative constitutional experience to the question of whether federal law could command state
and local officials to enforce a federal regulatory scheme). Justice Scalia went on to say that "our
federalism is not Europes."Id Some rare examples where comparative constitutional experience
has been referred to by Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in constitutional cases are Justice
Breyees dissent inPrintz, id. at 976-78 (referring to the structure of federalism in Switzerland,
'Germany, and the European Union as authority for the proposition that the federal power to
command state officials to enforce a federal regulatory scheme is compatible with the democratic
virtues of a federal system); Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority judgment in Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 718 n.16 (1997) (discussing the constitutionality of prohibitions on
assisted suicide in Canada and Colombia); and Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion in New York
v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583 n.5 (1946) (referring to the Argentinean, Australian, Brazilian,
and Canadian Constitutions and to Brazilian constitutional jurisprudence).
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The growth in the use of comparative jurisprudence is part of a larger
phenomenon: the globalization of the practice of modem constitutionalism. 2
Globalization does not simply mean that the commitment to constitutionalism is
now widespread. Rather, as Louis Henkin observes, globalization implies
additionally that "the spread of constitutionalism owes much to particular sources
and models."3 In other words, in this context, globalization has come to mean the
reliance on comparative materials at all stages in the life cycle of modem
constitutions. The use of comparative jurisprudence is but one example. Another
is the use of foreign constitutions as models in the process of constitution-making.
One prominent model has been the American Constitution, in particular its Bill of
Rights;4 however, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms5 has, in recent
years, become a leading alternative, and has influenced the drafting of the South
2. BruceAckerman has referred to this phenomenon as the "rise of world constitutionalism."
Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REv. 771 (1997); see also
Heinz Klug, Introducing the Devil: An Institutional Analysis of the Power of Constitutional
Review, 13 S.AmR. J. HuM. RTs. 185, 186 (1997) (describing "a globalization of the notion that
individual rights, inscribed in written constitutions, are an essential component of democratic
governance'). AlthoughAckerman and Klug seem to regard this phenomenon as relatively recent,
as long ago as 1979 a leading casebook proclaimed "a worldwide explosion" in judicial review.
MAURO CAPPELLETTI & WILLIAM COHEN, CoMwARATVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: CASES AND
MARLAis 12 (1979).
3. Louis Hekin, A NewBirth of Constitutionalivn: Genetic Influences and Genetic Defects,
14 CARDozoL. RHv. 533,533 (1993); see also CONSTrrUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE
OF THE UNITED STATEs CoNsvrrloN ABROAD (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter
CoNsTnmoxALsMAND RIGHTS].
4. See generally CONSTErmONASMAND RGHTS, supra note 3; Anthony Lester QC, The
Overseas Trade in the American Bill ofRights, 88 CoLUM. L. REV. 537 (1988). Although many
new constitutions have incorporated bills of rights, I do not claim that such documents are part of
the definition of a constitution. As Giovanni Sartori argues:
Is a constitution without a bill of rights an incomplete constitution? I would agree
with Madison and Hamilton that declarations of rights are not a necessary condition
of constitutions.... [A] constitution without a declaration of rights still is a
constitution, whereas a constitution whose core and centerpiece is not a frame of
government is not a constitution.
GIovANNI SARTORI, COMPARATIVE CoNsTmmoNAL ENGNEERiNG 197-98 (1st ed. 1994). But
cf Jon Elster, Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction, 58 U. Cm. L. RFv. 447,
465 (1991) (stating that "[a] constitution, considered as a written document, serves three
interrelated functions: [first] to define and protect the rights of the citizens').
5. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms)
[hereinafter Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms].
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African Bill of Rights,6 the Israeli Basic Laws,7 the New Zealand Bill of Rights,'
and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights.9 Moreover, Jon Elster, commenting on the
Eastern European experience with constitution-building, has observed that "[iln
constitutional debates, one invariably finds a large number of references to other
constitutions" not only "as models to be imitated," but also "as disasters to be
avoided, or simply as evidence for certain views about human nature.""0
The globalization of the practice of modern constitutionalism generally, and the
use of comparative jurisprudence in particular, raise difficult theoretical questions
because they stand at odds with one of the dominant understandings of
constitutionalism: that the constitution of a nation emerges from, embodies, and
aspires to sustain or respond to that nation's particular history and political
traditions. As Jurgen Habermas has explained, the citizens of a nation often use
constitutional discourse as a means to "clarify the way they want to understand
themselves as citizens of a specific republic, as inhabitants of a specific region, as
heirs to a specific culture, which traditions they want to perpetuate and which they
want to discontinue, [and] how they want to deal with their history."'" Indeed, for
6. S. Am. CoNST. ch. 2 (adopted May 8, 1996; amended Oct. 11, 1996). For a general
overview ofthe South African Bill of Rights, see Richard J. Goldstone, The South African Bill of
Rights, 32 TEX INT'L L.J. 451 (1997).
7. Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 1992, S.H. 1387; Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty, 1992, S.H. 1391. For the influence of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on
the drafting of Israel's Basic Laws, see Adam M. Dodek, The Charter... in the Holy Land?, 8
CONST. F. 5 (1996); Lorraine Weinrib, Canada's Charter: Rights Protection in the Cultural
Mosaic, 4 CARDOZO J. INT'L & Cohs'. L. 395 (1996); and Lorraine Weinrib, The Canadian
CharterAs aModelfor Israel'sBasicLaws, 4 CoNsT. F. 85 (1993). For the influence of Canadian
jurisprudence onthe interpretation oftheBasic Laws, see generally Dodek, supra, and Zeev Segal,
The Israeli ConstitutionalRevolution: The Canadian Impact in the Midst of a Formative Period,
8 CONST. F. 53 (1997).
8. Bill of Rights Act, 1990 (N.Z.). For a discussion of the influence of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms on the drafting of the New Zealand Bill of Rights, see Paul Rishworth,
The Birth and Rebirth of the Bill ofRights, in RIGHTs AND FREEDoMs: Tm NEW ZEALAND B IL
OF RioHs ACT 1990 AND Tm HUMAN RiHTs AcT 1993, at 1, 12-18 (Grant Huscroft & Paul
Kishworth eds., 1995). For a critical assessment of the New Zealand Bill of Rights, see Aidrew
S. Butler, The Bill of Rights Debate: Why the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 Is a Bad
Model for Britain, 17 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1997).
9. Hong Kong Bill ofRights Ordinance, No. 59 (1991). One of the authors of the Canadian
Charter was involved in the drafting of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights. See James AllanA Bill of
Rightsfor Hong Kong, 1991 PuB. L. 175,175.
10. Elster, supra note 4, at 476; see also Andrzej Rapaczynski, Constitutional Politics in
Poland: A Report on the Constitutional Committee of the Polish Parliament, 58 U. CmI. L. REV.
595, 609-10 (1991) (describing the examination of American and German models for
constitutional judicial review by the Constitutional Committee of the Polish Parliament).
11. Jllrgen Habermas, Strugglesfor Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State, in
MULTCUTuRALisMEX A1vNrNGTHEPOLmCS OF RECOGNITION 107,125 (Amy Guttman ed., 2d
ed. 1994); see also RONALD L CHEFFINS & RONALD. N. TUCKER, Tim CONsTTUIoNAL PRocEss
IN CANADA 4 (2d ed. 1975) (describing a constitution as "a mirror reflecting the national sourl);
Pam W. HOGG, CoNsTrrtuONAL LAw OF CANADA 3 (1992) (stating that a Constitution "must
recognize and protect the values of a nation").
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some countries, constitutions are an integral component of national identity, and
reflect one way in which those nations view themselves as different from others.
This traditional view of constitutions has important implications for the nature
and structure of constitutional theories. By constitutional theories, I mean theories
which simultaneously strive both to explain and to justify a particular nation's
constitutional text and practice. Quite often, constitutional theories consist of or
include theories of constitutional interpretation, which suggest how a constitutional
text (or extra textual norms) should be applied to the resolution of concrete cases
before courts of law. On the account of constitutionalism I have offered above,
theories of constitutional interpretation are situated or particular, in that they are
located in both professional and academic discourse in terms that are meant to be
internal to specific political and legal systems.
American theories of constitutional interpretation, despite fundamental
differences in methodology and outlook, share this common premise. Bruce
Ackerman, for example, has written,
America is a world power, but does it have the strength to understand itselF? Is
it content, even now, to remain an intellectual colony, borrowing European
categories to decode the meaning of its national identity? ... To discover the
Constitution, we must approach it without the assistance of guides imported
from another time and place. Neither Aristotle nor Cicero, Montesquieu nor
Locke, Harrington nor Hume, Kant nor Weber will provide the key. Americans
have borrowed much from such thinkers, but they have also built a genuinely
distinctive pattern of constitutional thought and practice."
Similarly, originalists such as Robert Bork assert that the American Constitution
should be interpreted according to "what the public... [at the time of the framing]
would have understood the words to mean." 3 John Hart Ely, by contrast, looks not
to original understanding, but to the structure of the American Constitution as
reflected in the jurisprudence of the Warren Court, and asserts that the Constitution
reflects a commitment to "ensuring broad participation in the processes and
distributions of government." 4 Liberal republicans like Frank Michelman can be
understood in one respect as occupying a middle position between Bork and Ely,
because they find a commitment to self-determination through representative
institutions deep within American political and legal history." Nor is the theme of
constitutional nationalism confined to America. Chief Justice Ahron Barak of the
Supreme Court of Israel has written, for example, that the interpretation of the
12. 1 BRucE ACKERMAN, WE THB PEOPLE: FouNDArloNs 3 (1991). But see David Al.
Richards, Revolution and Constitutionalismn in America, 14 CARDOzo L. REv. 577, 584-86
(1993) (discussing the use of comparative political science-through the works of Machiavelli,
Harrington, Montesquieu, Hume, Smith, Ferguson, and Millar-by the Founders in 1787).
13. ROBERTH. BORK, THE TEMPrNG oFAMEmCA: THE PoLmCAL SEDUCnON OF THE LAW
144 (1990); see also Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849
(1989).
14. JOHNHARTELYDEMOCRACYAND DISTRUST A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvifw 87 (1980).
15.SeeFrankMlchelman, Law'sRepublic, 97 YALBL.J. 1493 (1988); FrankL Michelman,
The Supreme Court 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces ofSelrGovernment, 100 HARv. L. REV. 4
(1986).
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Basic Laws must "crystallize the modem self-understanding of Israeli society; in
other words, its very identity." 6
It is fair to say that constitutions continue to be widely understood in this
particular and local way. However, the globalization of the practice of modem
constitutionalism is a force with which constitutional theories, and hence theories
of constitutional interpretation, must come to terms. What seems to be needed is an
understanding of modem constitutions that is simultaneously global and local-a
difficult but not impossible task. My goal, though, is somewhat narrower: to
describe and explain the interpretive methodologies used, and the normative
justifications offered, by courts for their use of comparative jurisprudence in
constitutional interpretation.
The impetus to make sense of comparative constitutional interpretation is the
premise that law is the source of, and the means for the exercise of, the coercive
power of the state. Conventionally, executives and legislatures have been viewed
as the wielders of that power. The role of the courts has been understood quite
differently; as the authoritative interpreters of law, particularly in constitutional
cases, courts validate and legitimize the exercise of power by executives and
legislatures. In recent years, the validating role of the courts has been refined
through the renewed emphasis, in legal and political theory, on the link between the
legitimacy of public authority and public justification. 7 On this account, the
exercIse of public power, in order to be legitimate, must be justified according to
some language or discourse of reason. Contemporary legal theorists often argue, in
this vein, that courts should legitimize public power by serving as vehicles through
which legislatures and executives engage in a process of reason giving. 8
However, courts themselves, because of their central role in the validation of
public power, are equally under an obligation to engage in a process of public
justification for their own decisions. For some jurists, this duty means, in the
constitutional context, that the substantive principles of constitutional law must
cohere with and further a particular vision of political morality. That is certainly
true, although the manner in which, and the extent to which, courts can fulfill that
goal are complex. 9 However, the important point here is that courts are equally
obliged to justify their interpretive methodologies. The various features of legal
reasoning-the doctrine of stare decisis, for example-are more than just the means
through which courts arrive at decisions; they define and constitute the institutional
identity of courts. As a consequence, the very legitimacy of judicial institutions
hinges on interpretive methodology.
16. Ahron Barak, A Constitutional Revolution: Israel's Basic Laws, 4 CoNsT. F. 83, 84
(1993).
17. See, e.g., JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., MIIT Press 1996); JOHN
RAWLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); David Dyzenhaus, The Legitimacy of Legality, 46 U.
TORONTO L.J. 129, 162 (1996).
18. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNsTEIN, THE PARTIAL CoNsTrrtnoN ch. 2 (1993) (describing a
"Republic of Reasons").
19. See generally CASS R. SuNsTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITIcAL CONFLICT (1996);
Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely TheorizedAgreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995).
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In this light, the tendency of American constitutional theorists to rely on local and
particular sources as aids to interpretation is revealing, for two reasons. Positively,
this tendency suggests that the use of local and particular sources in constitutional
reasoning secures the legitimacy of judicial review. Negatively, it suggests that
reliance on foreign sources is prima facie illegitimate, because those sources are
drawn from outside the legal system at hand.2" Presumptively, then, courts must
justify why comparative law should count.
In this Article, I argue that the answer to this question lies embedded in the actual
practice of comparative constitutional interpretation. Through a discussion of case
studies, I claim that comparative jurisprudence is used in three different ways in
constitutional adjudication, and that each of these interpretive methodologies, in
turn, articulates distinct normative justifications for the use of comparative law. The
first interpretive mode, universalist interpretation, holds that constitutional
guarantees are cut from a universal cloth, and, hence, that all constitutional courts
are engaged in the identification, interpretation, and application of the same set of
norms. Those norms are comprehended as transcendent legal principles that are
logically prior to positive rules of law and legal doctrines.
The second mode, genealogical interpretation, holds that constitutions are often
tied together by complicated relationships of descent and history, and that those
relationships are sufficient justification to import and apply entire areas of
constitutional doctrine. In stark contrast to universalist interpretation, genealogical
argument is positivist in structure, because genealogical relationships confer
sufficient authority and validity on comparative sources to make them legally
binding.
In the third mode, dialogical interpretation, courts identify the normative and
factual assumptions underlying their own constitutional jurisprudence by engaging
with comparable jurisprudence of other jurisdictions. Through a process of
interpretive self-reflection, courts may conclude that domestic and foreign
assumptions are sufficiently similar to one another to warrant the use of
comparative law. Conversely, courts may conclude that comparative jurisprudence
has emerged from a fundamentally different constitutional order; this realization
may sharpen an awareness of constitutional difference or distinctiveness. Dialogical
20. BruceAckerman's comments, see supra text accompanying note 12, capture this attitude.
So dothe comments ofJusdice Scalia dissenting in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868-69
n.4 (1988). In dismissing the relevance of an Amnesty International report discussing the
prevalence of the death penalty for minors in foreign jurisdictions to the constitutionality of the
death penalty for persons under age 16 in the United States, Justice Scalia stated:
We must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States ofAmerica that
we are expounding. The practices of other nations, particularly other democracies,
can be relevant to determining whether a practice uniform among our people is not
merely a historical accident, but rather so "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"
that it occupies a place not merely in our mores but, text permitting, in our
Constitution as well. But where there is not first a settled consensus among our own
people, the views of other nations, however enlightenedthe Justices of this Court
may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans through the Constitution.
Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325 (1937)) (citation omitted).
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interpretation appears to make no normative claims; it is more a legal technique
than a theory of legal interpretation.
Once the normative skeleton of comparative constitutional interpretation is laid
bare, a much needed and long overdue constitutional conversation on this practice
can begin. That conversation should revolve around three different issues: the scope
of each mode of comparative constitutional interpretation, the effect of each mode
on domestic constitutional culture, and the legitimacy of the normative claims that
each mode entails. By illustrating how that conversation could unfold, I hope to
clarify what is at stake when courts weave comparative jurisprudence into
constitutional discourse.21
My analysis proceeds as follows. In Part I, I review the critical literature, outline
the approach of this study, and introduce the three different modes of comparative
constitutional interpretation. As an expository aid, I characterize the key features
of each of these interpretive modes by reference to a corresponding school of
comparative legal studies. In Parts III, IV, and V, I explore each of these modes in
turn, through the use of concrete case studies. For the most part, these are drawn
from the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of South Africa (Parts III and
IV), although one section is devoted almost exclusively to Canadian constitutional
case law (Part V). Finally, in Part VI, I attempt to draw some general conclusions,
and suggest what significance those conclusions have for the ongoing use of
comparative jurisprudence in constitutional adjudication.
21. At the outset, I wish to clarify that I will not be examining the use of comparative
jurisprudence by national courts in order to give effect to the norms of an international legal
system. The most prominent example of this sort of legal regime is the European Union, where
national courts are under an obligation to interpret and apply European Union legal norms, and to
give them supremacy over any conflicting national law. See DEREKWYATr &ALAN DASHWOOD,
WYATrANDDAsHWOOD'S EUROPEANCOMMUNrrYLAw(3d ed. 1993). When applying Union-law,
national courts ofthe various member states often refer to the decisions of the European Court of
Justice ("ECJ"), the judicial body charged with the responsibility of interpretirig the various
treaties, legislation, and regulations that comprise the corpus of European law. They cite the ECJ
in the way that a state courtwould cite a decision ofthe U.S. Supreme Court, as binding authority.
Anne-Marie Slaughter has appropriately termed this use of comparative jurisprudence as "vertical
communication." Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transudicial Communication, 29 U.
RICH. L. Rlv. 99, 106-11 (1994). What interests me, however, is the reliance on foreign
jurisprudence that is not legally binding. In these situations, a court is faced with an interpretive
choice, and consciously decides to refer to and engage with foreign jurisprudence, even though it
is not legally compelled to do so.
Itis possible to imagine a situation where the authoritativeness of a comparative source stands
somewhere between being "vertical" or binding, and nonbinding. One example is the influence
of U.S. Supreme Court interpretations of the U.S. Constitution on the interpretation of similar or
analogous provisions in state constitutions by state supreme courts. In a strictly positivist sense, the
interpretation of the Federal Constitution has no legal bearing on the interpretation of state
constitutions, because they are distinct documents. Nevertheless, given the position of both the
Federal Constitution and the Supreme Court within the culture ofAmerican constitutionalism, the
construction that the latter body puts on the former document may exert a precedential force that,
although not legally binding, is rather powerful.
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II. Tim MODES OF CoMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
hITERPRETATION INTRODUCED
A. The State of the Literature and the Approach of this
Study
Although there is a large and growing body of scholarship on comparative
constitutional law, very little of it deals with the questions I explore. For example,
a great deal of scholarly attention has been devoted to identifying the structural
similarities between various constitutional documents.22 However, such analyses do
not address questions of constitutional interpretation, let alone the use of
comparative case law. A number of scholars, meanwhile, have compared the
jurisprudence of different jurisdictions. Some merely describe differences in case
law between countries at the level of doctrine.23 Others go further and scrutinize the
jurisprudence of one jurisdiction in the light of arguments of principle drawn from
another. 24 The most ambitious scholars use comparative law as a vehicle to both
identify and explore the assumptions, both factual and normative, underlying
constitutional argument in different countries.25 Sometimes, they seek to expose and
compare these assumptions as a means of provoking fundamental legal change. 26
However, none of these scholars have examined the use of comparative law in
actual constitutional interpretation.
Those few scholars who have turned their attention to this legal phenomenon have
done so in ways that fail to shed light on some important questions. Some articles,
for example, simply describe the use of comparative jurisprudence in a relatively
superficial manner, without unpacking the different ways in which comparative case
law is used, and without reflecting on the implications of the use of foreign case law
for theories of constitutional interpretation.2 ' Those commentators who have turned
22. See, e.g., Paul Bender, The Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms and the United
States Bill ofRights: A Comparison, 28 McGiL L.J. 811 (1983).
23. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDs: INDVIDuALs, COmmuNmEs, AND
LmERTIEs OF SPEECH (1995).
24. See, e g., Andrew S. Butler, ConstitutionalRights in Private Litigation: A Critique and
ComparativeAnas&,22ANGLO-AUL.Rv. 1 (1993); Gerald L. Neuman, Casey in the Mirror:
Abortion, Abuse and the Right to Protection in the United States and Germany, 43 AM. J. COM.
L. 273 (1995).
25. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DIsCOuRSE 152-63 (1991); Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon,
40 EMORYLJ. 837 (1991); Donald P. Kommers, The Jurisprudence ofFree Speech in the United
States and the Federal Republic of Germany, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 657 (1980); Mayo Moran,
TaIkdngAbout Hate Speech: A RhetoricalAna4sis ofAmerican and Canadian Approaches to
the Regulation ofHate Speech, 1994 Wis. L. Rnv. 1425.
26. See, e.g, GLENDON, supra note 25, at 146-58; and Moran, supra note 25, at 1497-1514.
27. See, e.g., Peter McCormick, The Supreme Court of Canada and American Citations
1945-1994: A Statistical Overview, 8 Sup. CT. L. REv. (2d) 527 (1997); Christopher P. Manfredi,
The Canadian Supreme Court and American Judicial Review: United States Constitutional
Jurisprudence and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 40 AM. . COM. L. 213
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their attention to theoretical questions, moreover, sometimes explain comparative
constitutional interpretation by reference to international relations theory.28 But a
fuller account must give sufficient weight to the facts that courts are interpreting
domestic constitutions which may not give effect to international legal obligations,
that those courts do not always evince an express intention to give effect to
international legal norms, and that those courts often rely on comparative sources
which are not necessarily part of international law.
Most recently, some authors have sought to explain why the Constitutional Court
of South Africa has relied to such a great extent on foreign jurisprudence, but they
continue to leave many important questions unanswered. One author, for example,
simply states that comparative jurisprudence was regarded by the court in State v.
Makwanyane29 as a "guiding forceo in its interpretation of the South African Bill
of Rights," but does not fully explain what kind of guidance foreign jurisprudence
provided in that case."0
A suitable account of the use of comparative jurisprudence in constitutional
interpretation should address two central questions, one empirical, the other more
normative. First, it should accurately and analytically describe the practice of
comparative constitutional interpretation. Although comparative jurisprudence can
be and often is used as judicial "window-dressing"-consisting merely of citations
to foreign judgments without much discussion or analysis-in other circumstances,
courts examine and engage with foreign jurisprudence in complex and different
ways. As a merely descriptive matter, then, academic study should explore the
interpretive methodologies employed by courts. Second, an informative account of
comparative constitutional interpretation should outline the normative justifications,
both explicit and implicit, offered by courts when relying on comparative case law.
Again, these normative justifications are diverse.
The answers to these two questions, although analytically distinct, are related in
a fundamentally important way. The interpretive methodologies of comparative
constitutional interpretation point to deeper normative premises regarding the
justifications for the use of comparative jurisprudence. That is, the way a court
reasons with foreign sources reflects why it thinks foreign sources are worth
discussing. Moreover, courts have been less than forthcoming about justifying their
use of comparative materials, which has made these normative premises somewhat
inaccessible. This suggests that we may instead gaze at those normative premises
through the lens of interpretive style.3 The task at hand is to first set out these
(1992).
28. See generally, e.g., Slaughter, supra note 21.
29. 1995 (3) SALR 391 (CC).
30. Peter Norbert Bouckaert, Shutting Down the Death Factory: The Abolition of Capital
Punishment in South Africa, 32 STAN. J. INT'LL. 287,304-05 (1996). A similar point is made by
Bernard E. Harcourt, Comment, Mature Adjudication: Interpretive Choice in Recent Death
Penalty Cases, 9 HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 255,257,266 (1996).
31. For a similar suggestion, see Mitehel de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser, Comparative Law and
Comparative Literature: A Project in Progress, 1997 UTAH L. REv. 471,481; Mitehel de S.-O.-
I'E. Lasser, Judicial (Sel-) Portraits: JudicialDiscourse in the French Legal System, 104 YALE
L.J. 1325, 1326-27 (1995).
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interpretive methodologies, in order to then identify the normative premises
underlying each one.
B. The Relevance of Comparative Legal Studies
Comparative jurisprudence is used in three different ways in constitutional
interpretation, each of which points to a different understanding of the relationship
between national constitutions and constitutions worldwide. In this part, I briefly
introduce these modes of comparative constitutional interpretation. Later, I examine
them through the lens of case studies that bring out, in sharp relief, the differences
among them.
These modes of interpretation map onto different conceptions of the academic
discipline of comparative law, which is broadly defined as the study of how and why
legal rules and systems differ or are the same. In its "pure" form, comparative law
asks these questions for their own sake. However, the field of comparative legal
studies has a significant applied dimension as well. Typically, the study of foreign
legal systems is an important tool for legislators interested in law reform and the
harmonization of legislation across different jurisdictions.32 Increasingly, though,
comparative law is of practical use not just to legislators, but also to courts
interested in looking to foreign solutions for help in resolving nettlesome problems
in domestic law.3
Beyond these broad generalities, however, comparative law scholars differ
sharply on the aims and purposes of their discipline. One leading casebook has
gone so far as to say that "comparative law ... is experiencing something of an
identity crisis."'34 Various visions for comparative law correspond to different ways
of using (or refusing to use) comparative jurisprudence in constitutional
adjudication. In the parts that follow, I will use these different conceptions as
explanatory aids to illuminate the actual practice of courts, because they either
make explicit many of the normative claims that courts implicitly rely on, or help
to flesh out the normative claims that courts explicitly advance.35
32. For a general discussion, see Jonathan Hill, Comparative Law, Law Reform and Legal
Theory, 9 OxFoRD J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1989). Perhaps the best known example of the use of
comparative law as a tool in law reform is the reliance on the French and German civil codes as
models by countries around the world.
33. See, e.g., T. Koopmans, Comparative Law and the Courts, 45 Ir'L & COMP. L.Q. 545
(1996).
34. MARYA. GLENDONETAL., COMPARATiVE LEGAL TRADmONS 8 (2d ed. 1994).
35. For other attempts to describe different schools of comparative legal studies, see GOnter
Frankenberg, Stranger than Paradise: Identity & Politics in Comparative Law, 1997 UTAH L.
REV. 259,262-74; David Kennedy, NewApproaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and
International Governance, 1997 UTAHL. REV. 545, 595-606.
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C. Legal Particularism, Legal Hegemony, and the Refusal
to Use Comparative Jurisprudence
I begin by amplifying the case against the use of comparative jurisprudence in
constitutional adjudication. One such interpretive attitude is "legal particularism,"
which emphasizes that legal norms and institutions generally, and constitutions in
particular, both emerge from and reflect particular national circumstances, most
centrally a nation's history and political culture. In its strongest formulation, legal
particularism asserts that constitutions are important aspects of national identity.
Comparative jurisprudence is of no assistance at all, precisely because it comes
from outside a given legal system. At best, it represents a foreign curiosity of
strictly academic interest and little practical relevance. At worst, its use is a foreign
imposition or even a form of legal imperialism.36
Legal particularism underlies most American theories of constitutional
interpretation. But the refusal to use comparative ease law also finds intellectual
support in a school of comparative legal studies represented by scholars like
William Alford,37 George Fletcher,3" and Frederick Schauer.39 These scholars take
seriously divergences among legal systems, and give them normative bite. But their
starting point is to emphasize differences where there appear to be none-that is,
where different legal systems appear very similar because they employ the same
terminology, such as rights, duties, liberties, powers, and so on. On their account,
these similarities are rather superficial, and conceal profound differences not
apparent at first glance. Alford, for example, discussing the use of familiar
vocabulary (rights, liberties) to frame constitutional guarantees in China, states that
one cannot thereby conclude that "the Chinese are finally adopting a legal system
that contains at least the beginnings of a rule of law ideal," because such a
conclusion would assume that the use of familiar language indicates "that the
Chinese mean to and will, in fact, be acting as we believe we do when we use it."4
Particularists' common argument is that in a post-Realist world, it is beyond
dispute that legal texts are inherently ambiguous and require reference to extra-
textual sources for their interpretation and application in concrete cases. Moreover,
although "overarching principles of political morality" provide some assistance,
36. For a discussion of legal imperialism, see Frankenberg, supra note 35, at 262 (describing
comparative law as "a postmodem form of conquest executed through legal transplants and
harmonization strategies"). See also John R. Schmidhauser, Power, Legal Imperialism, and
Dependency, 23 L. & Soc'Y REv. 857, 858 (1989) (discussing "[t]he significance of domestic
revolution, transnational military conquest, economic penetration, or cultural imperialism as key
variables in the relationship of a nation or territory to a particular family of law').
37. William P. Alford, On the Limits of"Grand Theory" in Comparative Law, 61 WASH. L.
RPv. 945 (1986).
38. George P. Fletcher, Constitutionalldentily, 14 CARDoZo L. REv. 737 (1993) [hereinafter
Fletcher, Constitutionalldentitv]; George P. Fletcher, The Universal and the Particular in Legal
Discourse, 1987 BYU L. RFv. 335 [hereinafter Fletcher, LegalDiscourse].
39. Frederick Schauer, Free Speech and the Cultural Contingency of Constitutional
Categories, 14 CARnozo L. Rsv. 865 (1993).
40. Alford, supra note 37, at 954.
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"these arguments quickly run dry" because the question then arises of which
political morality to choose.4 Significantly, particularists claim that courts, as a
matter of empirical fact, do not look outward to foreign experiences; rather, they
turn inward to sources which are internal to a particular country.
Particularists characterize the nature of internal sources in slightly different ways.
Alford, for example, describes them in terms of the "rhetoric and consciousness of
those abroad... [i.e.,] what people believe that they are doing," or the "self-
characterizations and self-perceptions" of actors within those legal systems,4 2
turning comparative law into a branch of cultural anthropology. Schauer
emphasizes the importance of cultural and political history. He views constitutional
adjudication as a "process of descriptive generalization," which he defines as "the
way in which certain events are seen [by a court] as (or as not) members of some
larger class or category,"43 such as protected or unprotected expression. The actual
process of categorization of a particular event is a function not of the constitutional
text, but rather of "cultural experience and cultural history."" Thus, a German court
may be able to distinguish between Nazi sympathizers and other peripheral political
actors, and uphold severe restrictions on the political activities of only the former,
whereas an American court could not. Fletcher, although he agrees with Schauer
on the centrality of history, incorporates history into the structure of legal argument
in various legal systems, which he defines as "the ideas, concepts, arguments and
doctrinal forms by which lawyers make sense of what they are doing and with which
they seek to persuade officials and each other of the justice of their cause."4 5 Those
arguments, in turn, reflect the accumulated experience of a system. Constitutional
decisions, therefore, "reflect . . . the legal culture in which the dispute is
embedded," and, as such, are "expressions of the decision makers' constitutional
identities.""
The reliance on internal sources-cultural and political history, the structure of
legal argument, or the "rhetoric and consciousness" of persons in a given
society-leads particularists to be skeptical of the viability of transplanting
constitutional doctrine from one country to another. Thus, Schauer "doubt[s] the
recent ease with which constitutional transplantation seem now to be embraced,"
because "so long as cultural differences are reflected in categorical differences,.
. [there are] likely to be pressures militating against the cross-cultural assimilation
of cultural categories." 7 Fletcher frames the difficulty as one of translation. A
concept central to the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, such as "reasonable"
or "trespass," cannot be transferred wholesale into the Russian Constitution, either
because those terms have no equivalent, or legal equivalent, in the Russian
language, or because those terms do not carry the same legal significance in the
Russian legal system as they do in American constitutional jurisprudence."
41. Fletcher, Consitutionalldentity, supra note 38, at 739.
42. Alford, supra note 37, at 947.
43. Schauer, supra note 39, at 867 (parenthetical in the original).
44.Id. at 877.
45. Fletcher, LegalDiscourse, supra note 38, at 336-39.
46. Fletcher, Constitutional Identiy, supra note 38, at 737.
47. Schauer, supra note 39, at 867, 879.
48. See Fletcher, LegalDiscourse, supra note 38, at 345-46.
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Alford's implicit point, meanwhile, is somewhat different: for him, transplants are
impossible because one cannot fully comprehend a foreign legal system "precisely
as would someone living" in that legal system.49
Arguably, legal particularism accounts for the steadfast refusal of American
courts to rely on foreign case law when interpreting the United States Constitution.
Thus, Justice Scalia has'admonished his colleagues to remember that "[w]e must
never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States of America that we are
expounding"5 and that "comparative analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of
interpreting a constitution."51 However, a more convincing explanation for the
unwillingness of American courts to look at foreign jurisprudence may not be legal
particularism, but rather an attitude of legal hegemony. Committed particularists
hold the view that no country can learn from any other. While hegemonists would
agree that American courts cannot learn from foreign jurisprudence, they would
nevertheless believe that courts abroad could learn a great deal from American
case law. This attitude is premised on the belief that all systems ofjudicial review
are derivative on American constitutionalism. 2 On this account, Americans
invented judicial review, have engaged in it more frequently, and for longer than
any other country in the world. Other jurisdictions are younger and relatively
inexperienced. Accordingly, the direction of comparative insight flows from
America outward, and not the other way around.
This interpretation of the place of American constitutional experience in the
global practice of constitutionalism is inadvertently reflected in recent well-
intentioned suggestions that American courts rely to a greater extent on comparative
materials. Thus, Justice Calabresi has endorsed the use of comparative
jurisprudence because other countries are its "constitutional offspring," and has
urged that "[w]ise parents do not hesitate to learn from their children." 53 Similarly,
Carol Steiker has suggested that American constitutional scholars look closely at
the decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa in Makwanyane, because
"[i]n some loosely metaphorical ways, South Africa is both a mirror for and the
child of the American legal system, or at least American constitutionalism." 4
49. Alford, supra note 37, at 948.
50. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4 (1988).
51. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.ll (1997).
52. See, e.g., RONALD M. DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMaicAN CoNsrrTrlmoN (1996).
Frangois Furet said recently, in a bicentennial lecture on the French Revolution, that
the most important development in democratic theory since World War I was the
continuing change, not only in Europe but in democracies across the world, from a
nijoritarian to a communal democratic system, in which the basic rights of men and
women are adjudicated by judges under an abstraet written constitution. He rightly
credited that most important development to the ideas of the American rather than
the French Revolution.... [IMt would be a historic shame if we begin now to
abandon our most distinctive and valuable contribution to democratic theory.
Id. at 71 (emphasis added).
53. United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464,469 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
54. Carol S. Striker, Pretoria, Not Peoria: FCIS S v. Makwanyane and Another, 1995 (3) SA
391, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1285, 1285 (1996).
These attitudes, however, are riot universal in the American academy. Thus, Mark Tushnet has
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D. Three Modes of Comparative Constitutional
Interpretation
1. Mode 1: Universalist Interpretation
At the opposite end of the spectrum from particularists stand scholars who posit
that constitutional guarantees are cut from a universal cloth, and that all
constitutional courts are engaged in the identification, interpretation, and
application of the same set of principles. Unlike particularists, who emphasize the
differences among legal systems, these scholars see unity in the midst of diversity.
This mode of comparative constitutional interpretation is "universalist," because
it exhorts courts to pay no heed to national legal particularities when engaging in
constitutional interpretation. Courts working in this interpretive mode regard
themselves "as giving meaning to liberties that transcend national boundaries."55
A universalist view of the law is an important strain in comparative law
scholarship. A leading textbook, for example, makes the descriptive claim that the
"basic rule of comparative law" is that "different legal systems give the same or
very similar solutions, even as to detail, to the same problems of life, despite the
great differences in their historical development, conceptual structure, and style of
operation. 56 This descriptive claim exists alongside a normative one-that systems
suggested that "[w]ith the spread of constitutional review throughout the world, we now have a
larger base of information on which to rest judgments about" the potential threats to democratic
decisionmaking raised by judicial review. Mark V. Tushnet, Policy Distortion andDemocratic
Debilitation: Comparative Illumination ofthe Countennajoritarian Diflculy, 94 McH. L. REv.
245, 249 (1995). Similarly, in stark contrast to his admonition of the apparent xenophilia of
American constitutional theorists in Wa THE PEoPLE: FOUNDATIONS, supra note 12, Bruce
Ackerman now derides the "emphatic provincialism" of American constitutional thought, and
claims that comparative jurisprudence offers "a formidable fund of experience for comparative
investigation," Ackerman, supra note 2, at 772-75. Most recently, J.M. Balkin and Sanford
Levinson have advocated the inclusion of comparative materials in American constitutional law
casebooks, noting that "W]ust as there is more than one way to design a democracy, there is surely
more than one way to interpret a constitutional provision." J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The
Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARv. L. REv. 963,1005 (1998).
55. GREENAwALT, supra note 23, at 12 (describing the Canadian constitutional jurisprudence
on free expression).
This style of reasoning has been evident in numerous aspects of South African constitutional
jurisprudence. Universalist interpretation played a dominant role in the striking down of the death
penalty in Makwanyane; moreover, and more interestingly, it did so even though most of the
decisions that the Constitutional Court relied on upheld the legality of capital punishment.
Universalist interpretation has also played a critical role in the development of the South African
jurisprudence on the presumption ofinnocence, which has relied extensively on Canadian case law
to strike down provisions reversing the onus of proof in criminal proceedings. The cases I will
focus on are State v. Zwna, 1995 (2) SALR 642 (CC), and State v. Coetzee, 1997 (3) BCLR 437
(CC). See infra Part IlL
56. KoNRADZWEIGERT & HEiNKOTz,NTRODucTION To COMPARATIVE LAW 36 (Tony Weir
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1987). Basil Markensinis has expressed the same view:
"Unashamedly, therefore, the series and the book, while not ignoring the differences, were aimed
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ought to be similar. It follows that "[e]very legal system in the world is open to the
same questions and subject to the same standards,"57 so that when systems do differ,
it is often the result of "historical accident or temporary or contingent
circumstances.""8 Thus, comparative law enables one to rank, compare, and
evaluate differing approaches taken by various jurisdictions, and "to discover which
solution of a problem is the best" or "clearly superior.""
The obvious objection to this approach is that such a comparison is impossible,
precisely because legal systems differ widely and deeply in their conceptual
structure. The response of comparative lawyers of this school is that one must look
beyond legal doctrine to the actualfunction of legal rules. As Otto Kahn-Freund
famously put it, "what is being compared is not that which is formulated and said
but that which is being done."6 Legal doctrines, on this account, are no more than
"man-made classifications" which should be "seen as what they are: intellectual
tools to be used and, if necessary, to be cast aside."'" In its strongest form, then, the
universalist strain of comparative legal scholarship dismisses the importance of
legal argument. It would apparently have little insight to shed on the migration of
constitutionaljurisprudence across national borders.
However, universalist arguments need not be so deeply skeptical. It can be argued
that the underlying functional similarities between the problems faced, and the
solutions proposed, by different legal systems can in fact become the foundation for
the grammar and theoretical concepts of a universal legal language. David Beatty
forcefully puts forth this view in a comparative study of constitutional adjudication,
claiming that "the basic principles of constitutional law are essentially the same
around the world, even though there is considerable variation in what guarantees
at underlying and underlining similarities, common problems, and the advantages of searching
together for similar or common answers." Basil Markensinis, Learning from Europe and
Learning in Europe, in Tfm GRADuAL CONVERGENCE: FOREIGN IDEAS, FOREIGN INFLUENCES AND
ENGLISH LAW ON THE EVE OF THE 21 ST CENTURY 2 (Basil Markensinis ed., 1994).
57. ZWEiGERT & KOTz, supra note 56, at 45.
58.Id. at3.
59.Id. at 8, 46.
60. Orro KAHu-FREUND, CoMARATIvELAwAs ANACADEIC SuBarE 21 (1965).
61. Id. at 22. Traditionally, the functionalist approach has been deployed most effectively in
the study of private law. "[C]omparative private law" is "the heartland of all comparative law."
ZWEiGET&KOMZ, supra note 56, at 4. Public law (i.e., constitutional and administrative law) has
always been set to one side, because it has been viewed as dificult to transplant from one country
to another, private law, by comparison, can be transplanted with relative ease. Kahn-Freund, in a
famous article, explained the difference in the "degrees of transferability" of public and private law
as a funeion of economic, cultural, and political environments. Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and
Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1974). The transferability of private law
from one country to another was a function of the degree of similarity between their economic and
cultural environments; Kahn-Freund asserted that economic and cultural convergence between
different countries therefore accounted for the ease with which private law could move across
national borders. See id. at 6. By contrast, the profound differences between the political
environments of countries suggested that the rules of public law are the ones most resistant to
transplantation. See id. at 8-13. On a strictly functional analysis, the globalization of the practice
of modem constitutionalism would suggest a degree of political convergence not present in Kahn-
Freund's day.
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constitutions contain and in the language that they employ."62 He finds such a unity
of approach notwithstanding that each of the courts he examines "has developed its
own unique style of review."63
Beatty's universal principles are in fact principles of justification or limitation,
which reduce the task ofjudicial review to the scrutiny of the infringement of rights.
But universalist interpretation may instead focus on the interpretation of
constitutional rights. Particular rights, such as freedom of expression, freedom of
religion, or freedom of association, could each be based on political theories of
what interests those rights are designed to protect. Universalists would hold that
those theories are the same for every constitution in which those rights are found.64
Comparative jurisprudence becomes a "repository of principles"6" to be relied on
as valuable articulations, explanations, and commentaries on the political theories
underlying particular constitutional rights. Additionally, foreign judgments suggest
how those rights are to be applied in concrete cases. A court no longer has to
engage in the burdensome and time-consuming task of formulating those ideals
itself, since comparative case law offers a convenient shortcut to attaining the same
goal.6
6
2. Mode 2: Dialogical Interpretation
In its strongest form, legal particularism regards the mutual unintelligibility or
incompatibility of legal systems as a fundamental barrier to the use of comparative
jurisprudence. Fletcher asserts, in this vein, that "there are differences in detail
[between legal systems] that are so profound they call into question the extent of a
shared foundation of legal thought."6 However, this position stands against the
conventionally expressed view that comparative law is an important tool for
understanding one's own legal system. Authors of comparative law textbooks
frequently express this position, albeit in slightly different ways. De Cruz, for
example, claims that the study of comparative law "encourages the student to be
more critical about the functions and purposes of the rules he is studying and to
learn not to accept their validity purely because they belong to his own system of
62. DAVID M. BRATTY, CONSTrrtONAL LAw iN THEoRY AND PRACTICE 10 (1995)
[hereinafter BEATTY, CONSTITTnIONAL LAW]. Beatty's claims are also advanced in David M.
Beatty, Law and Politics, 44 AM. I COMP. L. 131 (1996); and David M. Beatty, Constitutional
Rights in Japan and Canada, 41 AM. J. CoMP. L. 535 (1993).
63. BEATTY, CoNsTrrunoNAL LAw, supra note 62, at 105.
64. Along these lines, Mauro Cappelletti has asserted that "[i]t seems indisputable that behind
and beyond the many and often profound differences, there is in Western societies an essentially
common cultural heritage, a sharing of basic individual and societal values, and a pervasive
similarity in the evolution of approaches to fundamental values." Mauro Cappelletti, The "Mighty
Problem" ofJudicialReview and the Contributon of Comparative Analvsis, 53 S. CAL. L. Rn v.
409,412 (1980).
65. 1 borrow the term'epositoy of principle' from Alfred Cockrell, Rainbow Jurisprudence,
12 S. AF. J. HUM. RTs. 1, 27 (1996); Cockrell also uses the phrase "store-house of principles,"
to express the same idea. Id. at 26.
66. See Richard A. Epstein, All Quiet on the Eastern Front, 58 U. Cr. L. REv. 555, 557
(1991) (stating that "the general theory of sound governance travels well abroad").
67. Fletcher, LegalDiscourse, supra note 38, at 342.
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law." s Comparative law, in other words, exposes the practices of one's own legal
system as contingent and circumstantial, not transcendent and timeless. Glendon
and her co-authors emphasize how comparison forces one to explain features of
one's own legal system that one takes as a given, because "[c]omparison often picks
up issues or makes connections that remain invisible."69 In other words,
comparative jurisprudence can be an important stimulus to legal self-reflection. The
mode of comparative constitutional interpretation that these scholars point to is
"dialogical," because courts that take this interpretive approach engage in dialogue
with comparative jurisprudence in order to better understand their own
constitutional systems and jurisprudence.7"
The dialogical use of comparative legal materials has been advocated by Mary
Ann Glendon,7' William Ewald,72 and Glnter Frankenberg.7" Like particularists,
Glendon, Ewald, and Frankenberg hold the view that the legal doctrine found within
a legal system is best understood as expressing the underlying values or even the
identity of that system. The task of the comparative legal scholar is to peer through
the black-letter rules and discover the foundation of normative and factual
assumptions that undergirds constitutional argument. Glendon, for example,
68. PETER DE CRuz, COwMARATIVE LAw IN A CHANGING WORLD 15 (1995). For a similar
view, see BERNHARD GROSSFELD, THE STRENGTH AND WEAKNEss OF COMPARATIVE LAW 111
('1990).
69. GLENDONETAL., supra note 34, at 10. The following quotation from Femand Braudel
makes the same point
Live in London for a year, and you will not get to know much about the English.
But through comparison, and in the light of your surprise, you will suddenly come
to understand some of the more profound and individual characteristics of France,
which you did not previously understand because you know them too well.
I at 12 (quoting Fernand Bmudel, Histoire et Sciences Sociales: La Longue Dureg, in ANNALES:
ECONOMIEs, SociAlrs, CrvmsATIONs 725, 737 (1958)).
70. South African constitutional case law provides a number of vivid examples of dialogical
interpretation. The South African Constitutional Court has engaged in a thoughtful analysis of
American jurisprudence in defining the division of powers between the national and provincial
governments, see Ex Parte Speaker of the National Assembly: In Re Dispute Concerning the
Constitutionality ofCertain Provisions of the National Education Policy Bill 84 of 1995, 1996 (3)
SALR 289 (CC), under the Interim Constitution, see INrium S. A!Lk CONST. (Constitution ofthe
Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993) [hereinafter INTERIM S. AFR. CONST.]. Dialogical
reasoning also played a pivotal role in the dissenting judgments of a decision on the scope of the
StateAction Doctrine, again under the Interim Constitution. See Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1996 (3)
SAIR 850 (CC). Finally, comparative jurisprudence served as a stimulus to self-reflection in South
African decisions on religious freedom, see State v. Solberg, 1997 (10) BCLR 1348 (CC), and the
permissible scope of constitutional amendments, see Premier, Kwazulu-Natal v. President of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (1) SALR 769 (CC). See also infra PartIV.
71. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAw (1987) [hereinafter
GiLNoN,ABoRTIONAND DIvORCE]; Mary Ann GlendonA Beau Mentir Qui Vient de Loin: The
1988 Canadian Abortion Decision in Comparative Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 569 (1989)
[hereinafter Glendon, Canadian Abortion Decision].
72. William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (): What Was ItLike to Try a Rat?, 143 U.
PA. L. RRv. 1889 (1995).
73. Glnter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-Thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV.
IhT'IL.J. 411 (1985).
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describes comparative law as the study of "the rhetorical activity of law," and
writes,
Whether meant to or not, law, in addition to all the other things it does, tells
stories about the culture that helped to shape it and which it in turn helps to
shape: stories about who we are, where we came from, and where we are going.
... []t may be that law affects our lives at least as much by these stories as it
does by the specific rules, standards, institutions, and procedures of which it is
composed. Thus it is not an unworthy task for scholars to ask how law interprets
the world around it, what analogies and images it employs, what segments of
history and what aspects of human experience it treats as relevant.74
Ewald, by contrast, characterizes the task of the comparative lawyer not as a form
of cultural studies, but as a form of applied moral philosophy. Nevertheless, he
describes the deep structure of a legal system in similar terms:
[The broad internal principles that underlie the fundamental institutions of the
positive law are characteristically principles of political and moral philosophy:
principles about the nature of law, the extent of the justified power of the state,
the political responsibilities of courts and legislatures, the legitimacy of private
property, the nature of contractual obligation, the justification of punishment,
and so on."
Comprehending a foreign legal system as being organized around a core set of
normative and factual assumptions leads to a deeper understanding of that system.
But it also furthers legal self-understanding, because it invites the comparative
lawyer, or the judge, to compare those assumptions against the assumptions that
legal doctrine in her own system both reflects and constitutes. She may discover
that two legal systems, in Frankenberg's words, embody "competing political
visions and contradictory normative ideals."7 Comparative jurisprudence, then,
may sharpen our awareness of constitutional difference." But the converse may be
true as well. A foreign legal identity may prove to be astonishingly similar to our
own, or, more likely, similar in relevant respects. If the particular legal point which
prompted this course of comparison and self-reflection were open, a court would
be justified in "making a legal transfer or reception from the foreign country
concerned."" If the point were settled, the consequences could be even more
dramatic. Comparative jurisprudence could serve as a destabilizing force that would
74. GLENDON, ABORTIONAND DIVORCE, supra note 71, at 8-9.
75. Ewald, supra note 72, at 2144.
76. Frankenberg, supra note 73, at 452.
77. See GLENDoN, ABORTION AND DIVORCE, supra note 71, at 142. "Comparative law does
not provide blueprints or solutions. But awareness of foreign experiences does lead to the kind of
self-understanding that constitutes a necessary first step on the way toward working out our own
approaches to our own problems." Id.
In a similar vein, Richard Primus has argued that a desire to "articulate principles that
distinguished America from the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany contributed to a long line of
liberal Supreme Court decisions from the Second World War through the Warren era." Richard
Primus, A Brooding Omnipresence: Totalitarianism in Postwar Constitutional Thought, 106
YALE L.J. 423, 423 (1996). In my terminology, the Court reasoned dialogically not with foreign
jurisprudence, but with the Court's own understanding of the Nazi and Soviet legal regimes.
78. Edward McWhinney, The Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms: The Lessons of
Comparative Jurisprudence, 61 CAN. B. REv. 55,64 (1983).
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help us "to imagine the road not taken, to think and explore counterfactual
trajectories"; it "may allow us a vantage-in uncertainty-from which to re-
evaluate the givens of our legal world.
79
3. Mode 3: Genealogical Interpretation
The third mode of comparative constitutional interpretation holds that
constitutions are often tied together by complicated relationships of genealogy and
history, and that those relationships themselves offer sufficient justification to
import and apply entire areas of constitutional doctrine. I use the term "genealogical
relationships" rather deliberately, in order to distinguish them from Henkin's
"genetic relationships." For Henkin, constitutions are genetically related if one
influenced the framing of the other, or if both were framed under the influence of
a third.'e A genealogical relationship, on the other hand, describes a rather different
phenomenon-literally, the birth of one constitutional order from another.
Constitutions tied together by genealogy are related either like parent and child, or
like siblings who have emerged from the same parent legal system.8
Genealogical themes have been infrequently explored in the critical literature on
comparative law, because genealogical relationships, narrowly defined, are
relatively rare. Alan Watson has come closest to elaborating a genealogical theory
of comparative law, centered on the idea that comparative law is best understood
as "the study of the relationship of one legal system and its rules with another."'
Watson's theory of comparative law has two dimensions, one of which follows from
the other. First, he defines the relationships among legal systems strictly in
historical terms. A historical relationship exists "where one system or one of its
79. Frankenberg, supra note 73, at 454-55.
80. Henkin, supra note 3, at 536-38.
81. As I develop below, the case study that vividly illustrates genealogical interpretation is the
complicated relationship between the guarantees for aboriginal rights found in the Canadian
Constitulion, the (now-diluted) status of Indian tribes as domestic dependent nations in the United
States, and British imperial constitutional law. The Canadian Constitution, in contrast to the
American Constitution, explicitly affirms and recognizes "existing aboriginal.., rights." CAN.
CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada), § 35(l).
What is most unclear in this fonnulation is what existing rights aboriginal peoples have. It is widely
acknowledged that the answer to this interpretive question requires a consideration of the
normative foundations of and justifications for aboriginal rights. Canadian jurisprudence, reflecting
its sources in Brifish imperial constitutional law, has tended to ground the legitimacy of aboriginal
rights in the prior occupation of land. However, in the United States, Chief Justice John Marshall
derived a radically different principle from the practice of British colonizers: that the source of
aboriginal rights is to be found in the prior sovereignty of aboriginal nations. The judgments of
Chief Justice Marshall have haunted Canadian constitutional jurisprudence for over a century, and
to this day figure prominently in judicial decisions, legal argument, and academic commentary.
When it is invoked, I will argue, Canadian courts, lawyers, and scholars implicitly make a
genealogical claim-namely, that American jurisprudence is directly relevant because of its
common origins in the law of the British empire. See infra Part V.
82. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAw 6 (2d ed.
1993). For a recent assessment ofWatson's contributions to comparative law theory, see William
Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (): TheLogic of Legal Transplants, 43 Am. J. CoMP. L. 489
passim (1995).
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rules derives from another system, probably with modifications; where more than
one system or rules of such systems derive from a fin-ther system; or (where derive
is too strong a term) when one system exerts influence on another." 3 The second
dimeftsion of Watson's theory follows from the first. Given the prevalence of "legal
transplants" from one system to another, Watson asks what role they have played
in legal development.
Watson's theory is at best only an approximation of the genealogical mode of
comparative constitutional interpretation, but it is a useful one nevertheless. His
category of historical relationships embraces much more than relationships of
genealogy in the strict sense. But the notion that historical relationships are a
threshold constraint on the subject of comparisons is important, because it identifies
which systems can be the sources of genealogical arguments, and, more
importantly, which ones cannot. Where there is no historical relationship-for
example, where systems are similar but have had no historical contact-those
systems are not appropriate for comparative legal study. In this respect, the sources
of genealogical arguments are much narrower that those of universalist and
dialogical interpretation.
The second dimension of Watson's theory also finds expression in the
genealogical interpretive method. For him, legal transplants between systems are
a significant engine of legal change."' Watson's focus on transplants is distinctly
historical and retrospective-he looks to transplants to explain what has already
come to pass. Genealogical interpretation also looks to the past, but for a different
reason. It aims to rediscover forgotten historical relationships not to better
understand them, but to identify interpretive resources that may enable courts to
chart a new constitutional future.
E. Conclusion
In sum, courts use three different interpretive modes-universalist, dialogical,
and genealogical-when relying on comparative jurisprudence in constitutional
adjudication. In the next three sections of this Article, I explore each of these modes
through the use of case-studies. Although I have cast the three modes of
comparative constitutional interpretation as alternatives, they are not mutually
exclusive. Despite the fact that they are analytically distinct, they can in principle
be employed by the same judges, on the same courts, and with respect to the same
issues. Thus, as I suggest below, a Canadian court adjudicating an aboriginal rights
claim could look to the American jurisprudence on aboriginal rights both because
of its genealogical authority, and because it is substantively appealing. Indeed, in
the future, should the Supreme Court of Canada adopt a narrow view of the nature
and extent of the aboriginal right to self-government (if it accepts that such a right
exists), a dialogical interpretation of Chief Justice Marshall's judgment in
Worcester v. Georgia" might assist the court in shaping the contours of that right.
83. WATSON, supra note 82, at 7 (parenthetical in original).
84. See Alan Watson, Legal Transplants andLaw Reform, 92 LAw Q. REv. 79 (1976).
85.31 U.S. (6 Pet) 515 (1832).
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The modes of comparative constitutional interpretation can also be used in
response to one another. This is most evident in the South African case law. Thus,
in Du Plessis v. De Klerk, as I explain, the dissenting judges employed dialogical
reasoning to suggest that the South African Bill of Rights applied horizontally
between private parties. Their choice of interpretive methodology was a response,
in part, to universalist elements in the majority reasons and the trial judgment. The
latter judges had sought to assimilate the South African Bill of Rights into the larger
tradition of liberal constitutionalism, within which constitutional rights only operate
against the state.
Before turning to the case-studies, I address a methodological point concerning
the strength of my claim that the interpretive modes make sense of the use of
comparative materials in constitutional law. A critic could argue that these models
imply that comparative case law can be a determinative force in constitutional
adjudication. According to this critic, for a theory of comparative constitutional
interpretation to accurately reflect court practice, it would have to deny the reliance
on other interpretive methodologies (e.g., originalist, purposivist, etc.) in
constitutional adjudication. In other words, for my argument to stand, comparative
law would have to be an exclusionary reason for legal decisionmaking.87 An
exclusionary reason, in the context of constitutional adjudication, is a reason for
resolving a legal point in a certain manner, and for disregarding reasons for
resolving that point differently.
However, despite a recent suggestion that exclusionary reasons play an important
role in constitutional interpretation,8 the better view is that constitutional
adjudication is based upon a plural conception of authoritative reasons-that is, that
the tapestry of constitutional jurisprudence is voven out of a diverse set of values
which often operate simultaneously in particular legal disputes. These values arise
from a variety of sources. Constitutional adjudication, for example, draws on a
number of different sources for its legitimacy (e.g., political morality, constitutional
structure, or original intent), and these sources form the foundation of a diverse set
of interpretive styles. Moreover, constitutions contain provisions that incorporate
principles of political morality which are rather different (e.g., individual autonomy
and democratic governance), and are on occasion in tension with one another (e.g.,
freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial), which judges must interpret,
apply, and reconcile. Michelman gestures to the plural nature of authoritative
reasons in constitutional interpretation when he states that various interpretive
approaches "are multiple poles in a complex field of forces, among which judges
86. 1996 (3) SALR 850 (CC).
87. See JosEPH RAz, The Claims ofLaw, in THEAuTHoRrrY OF LAW: ESSAYS ONLAWAND
MORALrrY 28,32-33 (1979) [hereinafter THAUTrHoRrrY oFLAw].
88. See Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in
ConstitutionalLaw, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711,714 (1994).
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navigate and negotiate." 9 To extend Michelman's analogy, my goal is only to
ensure that comparative jurisprudence is recognized as a pole in that field. 90
III. UNIVERSALIST INTERPRETATION
A. Introduction
The interpretive methodology and the normative premises of universalist
interpretation are best exemplified by a series of judgments of the South African
Constitutional Court. These decisions, for the most part, revolve around the
interpretation and application of constitutional rights in the criminal process. For
example, the court has found that the death penalty amounts to "cruel, inhuman and
degrading punishment,"'" and that the reversal of the onus of proof with respect to
both an essential element of an offense and a collateral fact violates the presumption
of innocence.
A series of phrases in a number of the court's judgments gesture to the court's
interpretive approach in these decisions.93 For example, prefacing his extensive
discussion of comparative materials in Makwanyane, the President of the
Constitutional Court, Justice Chaskalson stated that "international and foreign
authorities are of value because they analy[z]e arguments for and against the death
sentence."94 Similarly, Justice Sachs wrote in another judgment that foreign
jurisprudence should be examined "with a view to finding principles rather than to
extracting rigid formulae, and to look for rationales rather than rules."95 Justice
Ackermann echoed this theme in a third decision, stating that foreign jurisprudence
was relevant "not in order to draw direct analogies, but to identify the underlying
reasoning with a view to establishing the norms that apply in other open and
democratic societies.
96
89. Frank L Mlchelman, A Constitutional Conversation with Professor FrankMichelman,
11 S.AFR. J. HuM. RTs. 477,483 (1995).
90. An additional methodological point relates to the selection of materials for inclusion in this
study. Comparativejurisprudence figures into literally hundreds, if not thousands, of constitutional
decisions. I make no claim to comprehensiveness. Nor do I claim to be representative in selecting
areas of law, courts and jurisdictions, and the dates of decisions. I selected the case-studies Iwill
now discuss because they provide vivid examples of the three different modes of comparative
constitutional argument I have identified. The most serious limitation of this approach is that the
models I will examine may not portray a completely accurate or realistic picture of the actual use
of comparative law in constitutional adjudication worldwide. However, my claim is not so
ambitious. I only take the narrow position that these models help to explain concrete instances of
comparative constitutional interpretation.
91. State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391,434 (CC).
92. See State v. Coetzee, 1997 (3) SALR 527, 535 (CC); State v. Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR 642,
655 (CC).
93. These cites have been identified by Cockrell, supra note 65, at 28, as well.
94. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 413.
95. Coetzee v. Government of the Republic of South Africa, 1995 (4) SALR 631,662 (CC).
96. Ferreira v. Levin, 1996 (1) SALR 984, 1025 (CC).
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These compact phrases, and the jurisprudence based on them, contain three main
ideas. The first is a philosophical claim about the nature of law-that is, that law
is best understood as consisting of a body of principles, rather than as a collection
(or even a system) of formal legal rules. This claim is reflected in the distinction
consistently drawn by the court between "arguments," "principles," and
"reasoning," on the one hand, and "rigid formulae" and "rules" on the other. For the
court, merely applying the latter would be a serious misuse of foreign
jurisprudence, whereas relying on the former is not only acceptable, but even
strongly advised.
The claim that the law should be viewed as a body of principles, not as a
collection of rules, was first and most famously made by Ronald Dworkin."' It is
useful to examine Dworkin's theory briefly in order to better understand
universalist methodology. Although Dworkin's arguments have shifted over the
years, his theory of law and adjudication contains a core set of ideas, the distinction
between principles and rules holding a central place amongst them. Dworkin's first
move in differentiating between rules and principles is an empirical one-namely,
a claim that legal argumentation and adjudication involve the use of standards that
have not been enacted into law according to formal criteria, but which courts
nevertheless regard as being law. Dworkin terms those standards principles, and
distinguishes them from formally enacted legal rules.9" The first dimension of the
distinction between principles and rules, then, is a difference in their relationships
to a positivist theory of legal sources.99
However, there are other dimensions to the distinction. (Indeed, in more recent
writings, Dworkin throws into question the importance of the positivist difference
between rules and principles, by noting that legal rules may "incorporate"
97. See generally RONALD M. DwORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE (1986); RONALD M. DwoRIN,A
MATER. OF PRINCIPLE (1985) [hereinafter DwoRxiN, A MATMR OF PRINcIPLE]; RONALD M.
DWORKNJ, TAKINGRiGms SinuousLY (1978) [hereinafter DwoRKN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUsLY];
DwoRiuN, supra note 52.
98. E.g., DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUsLY, supra note 97, at 22.
99.A critic of this interpretation of the Constitutional Court's jurisprudence could argue that
this distinction between rules and principles merely reflects the idea that the former, as positive
rules of law, can only legitimately come from within a country's legal system, whereas the latter,
which are merely legal arguments, can be drawn from any source. Arguments of principle are
indistinguishable whether drawn from foreign case law or philosophical texts, for in neither
instance do they represent law. But this criticism fails to account for the fact that the court clearly
believes it is relying on foreign law when it extracts arguments of principle from comparative
jurisprudence. Thus, as a purely descriptive matter, the court seems to reject the positivist
distinction between rules on the one hand, and principles on the other.
Positivists, like Joseph Raz, have responded to Dworkin's critique of legal positivism by pointing
out that principles can be regarded as law, even without being formally enacted, if the basic legal
rule within a legal system that recognizes legal sources so specifies. Joseph Raz, LegalPrinciples
and the Limits of the Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823,853 (1972). With this embellishment, the distinction
between positivists and Dworkin turns on whether judges make new law when they decide hard
cases, that is, cases which are not definitively governed by existing legal rules and precedents.
Dworkin answers this question in the negative. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUsLY, supra note
97, at 81. Positivists, on the other hand, would answer it in the affirmative.
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principles "by reference."') For Dworkin, other dimensions of the difference
between principles and rules, especially in the constitutional context, are captured
by the contrast Richard Fallon has recently drawn between "first principles" and
"doctrine."' Principles, or first principles, represent the basic or fundamental
ideas that both underlie and transcend formally enacted legal rules; legal rules, or
doctrine, are the means by which principles are implemented for the resolution of
concrete legal cases. Moreover, since principles constitute the intellectual
foundations of any legal order, they are often framed in extremely general terms. As
a consequence, they "are too vague to serve as rules of law" and "their effective
implementation requires the crafting" of precise rules or doctrine.' 2 Rules and
principles differ, then, not only in terms of whether they have been formally
enacted, but also in terms of their function, and the level of abstraction at which
they operate.
Dworkin's principles, for example, are extremely abstract. Thus, he takes the
"root principle" of the American Constitution to be the egalitarian idea "that
government must treat people as equals,""0 3 or that "government must treat all those
subject to its dominion as having equal moral and political status."'0 4 The specific
doctrines or rules of American constitutional law implement or actualize this basic
principle. This abstract egalitarian ideal points to the final and perhaps the most
important implication of Dworkin's understanding of the nature of law: that legal
principles often "invoke moral principles about political decency and justice."0
Adjudication, in other words, "brings political morality into the heart of
constitutional law."'0 6 Constitutional interpretation thus becomes an exercise in
applied political philosophy.'0 7
Universalist interpretation does not follow Dworkin entirely, however. Dworkin
holds that principles protect the rights of individuals and are trumps against the
100. DwoRKIN, supra note 52, at 7.
101. Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,Foreword Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54,
60,61 (1997).
102. Id. at 57.
103. DWORKIN,AMATrER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 97, at 70.
104. DWORKIN, supra note 52, at 8.
105. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
106.Id.
107. The link between legality and morality in Dworkin's legal theory was extremely influential
in SouthAfrica, and it should therefore come as no surprise that the South African court's use of
comparative sources reflects that influence. Apartheid relied heavily on legal institutions in order
to effectuate its racist policies, which, for some, had irretrievably undermined the legitimacy of the
law. For South African jurists and scholars, Dworkin's writings offered a way to re-imagine the
idea of legality and the role of law in the post-apartheid era. See, e.g., DAVID DYZENHAUS, HARD
CASES IN WICKED LEGAL SYsTMS: SOuTH AmuCAN LAW IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF LEGAL
PmiLosoPHY 21-24 (1991); Etienne Mureinik, Security andIntegrity, in LAW UNDER STRESS:
SouTH AFRIcAN LAw IN THE 1980s 197, 199-200 (T.W. Bennett et al. eds., 1988); Etienne
Mureinik, Dworkin andApartheid, in ESSAYS oN LAW AND SOCIAL PRACTICE N SOUTHAFRICA
181 (Hugh Corder ed., 1988); David Dyzenhaus, Law As Justification: Etienne Mureinik's
Conception of Legal Culture, 14 S. AFR. J. Hum. RTs. 11, 14-18 (1998). See generally Edwin
Cameron, Legal Chauvinsm, Executive-Mindedness and Justice-L.C. Steyn 's Impact on South
Afi'can Law, 99 S. AFR. L.J. 38 (1982).
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interests of the community."' Universalist interpretation, however, conceives of
principles more broadly. Alfred Cockrell, describing the resort to principle by the
Constitutional Court of South Africa, puts the point extremely well when he argues
that principles should be regarded as equivalent to "substantive reasons." He
defines substantive reasons as "content-oriented standards of validity, such that for
a legal rule to be valid it will be required to conform in some degree with notions
of what is substantively right, just or good."" 9 Substantive reasons include
principles as Dworkin has defined them. However, they need not be so limited; it
is possible to imagine a substantive reason that appeals to a community interest, for
example, such as ubuntu or forgiveness. 0
The second of the three ideas embedded in the South African Constitutional
Court's jurisprudence is that the principles of law it identifies in and draws from
foreign jurisprudence are transcendent. A transcendent principle is found within
more than one legal system. I use the term transcendent deliberately, in order to
clarify that although the court is engaging in "universalist interpretation," it is not
making the more extravagant claim that these principles are universal. This
distinction makes sense of the court's assertion that the legitimacy of the principles
expressed in foreign jurisprudence is made evident by the fact that they are found
elsewhere. Indeed, it may be that the legitimacy of these principles exists in
proportion to the extent to which they are found abroad. However, proof of the
legitimacy of these principles does not require their existence in all legal systems.
Notwithstanding the modesty of this claim, transcendence is based on an
ambitious philosophical view of the nature of law. Transcendence represents more
than an empirical assertion that legal principles are prevalent. It also embodies the
proposition that prevalence is proof of a legal principle's truth or rightness. Taken
to its logical conclusion, then, transcendence gestures to an understanding of legal
norms based on the natural law tradition, which holds that "[1] aw precedes the state
and continues to surround it.""' The law is something to be discovered or
apprehended through a process of interpretive reflection; comparative jurisprudence
offers a fund of similar reflections by courts and tribunals worldwide as an aid in
that process.
The court's desire to both appeal to, and situate its decisions within, a global
body of jurisprudence is palpable. Justice Sachs, for example, has argued that South
African constitutional jurisprudence must acknowledge "its existence as part of a
global development of constitutionalism and human rights.""' 2 Justice Langa,
108. See generally DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUsLY, supra note 97.
109. Cockrell, supra note 65, at 5 (citing PATRICK S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM
AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AiMRICAN LAw: A COeARATIV STUDY OF LEGAL RBASONING,
LEGAL T-EoRY, AND LEGAL INSTTrTONS 412-13 (1987)).
110. The notion ofubuntu played a role in some of the concurring judgments in Makwanyane.
Justice Langa, for example, explained that ubuntu was "a culture which places some emphasis on
communality and on the interdependence ofthe members of a community." State v. Makwanyane,
1995 (3) SALR 391,481 (CC). He and Justice Mokgoro relied on this concept to strike down the
death penalty, because capital punishment undermined a community's sense of unity. See id. at
480-83, 501-04.
111. H. Patrick Glenn, Persuasive Authority, 32 MCGiL L.J. 261,289 (1987).
112. State v. Mhlungu, 1995 (3) SALR 867,917 (CC).
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speaking for the court, has expressed a similar idea. Portraying South Africa as an
international outcast, he has claimed that the Constitution, and hence its
interpretation, "offers an opportunity for South Africans to join the mainstream." '
Likewise, Justice Ackermann has written that "[i]n construing and applying our
Constitution, we are dealing with fundamental legal norms which are steadily
becoming more universal in character."" 4 Margaret Burnham captures this strain
within the court's jurisprudence well when she argues that the use of comparative
jurisprudence is the court's vehicle for enabling South Africa to "claim] its place
among the world's constitutional democracies."" 5
The final idea animating universalist jurisprudence is the notion that transcendent
principles cannot be legitimate sources of law unless they are legal principles-that
is, principles whose existence is evinced by their presence in legal systems in other
countries. The importance of identifying these principles as legal is, at first blush,
puzling. It appears to represent a concession to a positivist theory of legal sources.
However, positivist understandings of the nature of the law do not sit comfortably
with universalist interpretation, with respect to both the role of principles, and the
natural law claims implicit in transcendence. More importantly, a positivist theory
of sources carries the greatest force in the context of sorting out legal from non-
legal sources within a legal system. Once it is acknowledged that a source is
foreign, the concern that it be identified as legal seems out of place, because a
foreign source cannot be a formal legal source.
What seems to be driving the court's insistence on the use of legal sources from
foreign jurisdictions is its understanding of its own constitutional role. A persistent
theme in the court's jurisprudence is the effort to distinguish legal decisionmaking
from political decisionmaking and philosophical rumination." 6 In this light, relying
on foreign jurisprudence as a source of ideas, rather than relying on extra-legal
sources such as philosophical treatises or even academic articles, anchors the
legitimacy of the court's decisions. It counters the impression that by looking to
foreign sources, the court is looking outside the law. In countries beginning their
experience with constitutional judicial review, the use of comparative law makes
normal and routine what would otherwise appear revolutionary and dramatically
new.
The court's reliance on legal sources deliberately situates it as part of a
transnational discussion among legal tribunals about the interpretation and
application of transcendent legal norms. The implicit image here is that of an
113. State v. Williams, 1995 (3) SALR 632,648 (CC).
114. Ferreira v. Levine, 1996 (1) SALR 984,1025 (CC).
115. Margaret A. Burnham, Cultivating a Seedling Charter: South Africa's Court Grows Its
Constitution, 3 MicH. J. RAcE & L. 29,44 (1997).
116. See, e.g., State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391,476 (CC).
In answering that question [(i.e., the constitutionality of the death penalty)] the
methods to be used are essentially legal, not moral or philosophical .... The "Court
of final instance over all matters relating to the interpretation, protection and
enforcemenf" of [the] provisions [of the Constitution] is this Court, appointment to
which is reserved for lawyers. The incumbents are Judges, not sages; their discipline
is the law, not ethics or philosophy and certainly not politics.
Id (Kriegler, J.) (quoting INTERiM S.AmR. CoNsT., supra note 70, § 98(2)) (footnotes omitted).
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international community of states and citizens that shares a basic commitment to a
vision of constitutionalism based on the rule of law and the rights of individuals.
The legal principles of universalist interpretation are the principles which animate
constitutionalism in this community of nations. However, many nations within this
community are at different points along the path to constitutionalism, progress, and
liberal democracy. Comparative jurisprudence offers guidance and wisdom to
nations beginning that journey as to how best to proceed down the road ahead." 7
These three basic ideas-that the law is best understood as a body of principles,
that those principles transcend national boundaries, and that those principles are
legal principles-combine together in two different variations of the South African
Constitutional Court's universalist interpretive methodology, as I discuss below.
The first version deploys arguments of principle culled from comparative case law
to develop the contours of specific guarantees in the South African Bill of Rights.
The second version has been utilized by the Constitutional Court when discussing
comparative jurisprudence that points to a conclusion different than that of the
court. Although that jurisprudence may be, at best, irrelevant to the interpretation
of the South African Constitution, or, at worst, proof that a legal principle is not
transcendent, the court nonetheless engages in a complex argument to show that the
law still consists of transcendent legal principles.
B. Universalism As Arguments of Principle: The
Presumption of Innocence in Zuma and Coetzee
Universalist interpretation played an important role in two of the court's
decisions on the presumption of innocence, State v. Zuma"8 and State v. Coetzee. 9
In Zuma, the court considered the constitutionality of a provision reversing the onus
of proof in criminal proceedings.' Under South African criminal law, confessions
are only admissible if proven to be free and voluntary; the provision at issue,
however, presumed that confessions to magistrates met this standard, and hence
imposed a burden on the accused to provide otherwise.
The court held that the provision violated the presumption of innocence
guaranteed by the Interim Constitution.' This conclusion required the court to
determine both (i) the nature of the protection provided by the guarantee of the
presumption of innocence, and (ii) how the guarantee was engaged by reverse onus
provisions. After noting that the presumption of innocence had long been a
principle of South African common law, the court (per Justice Kentridge) turned to
a discussion of American and Canadian decisions which had "grappled with the
problem of reconciling presumptions reversing the onus of proof with the
constitutional presumption of innocence."' The court reviewed these decisions in
search of a set of principles for interpreting the South African provision. Thus, it
117. For a similar view on the development of a community of liberal democratic nations, see
Anne-Marie Burley, Toward anAge ofLiberalNations, 33 HARV. INT'LL.J. 393 (1992).
118. 1995 (2) SALR 642 (CC).
119. 1997 (3) SALR 527 (CC).
120. Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 647.
121. INTERIM S. APR. CoNsT., supra note 70, § 25(3)(c).
122. Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR at 653 (emphasis omitted).
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noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had "over many years attempted to enunciate a
governing principle" concerning the constitutionality of reverse onus provisions."'
However, it rejected the American approach as "useful," but not "conclusive.""2 4
Instead, it found the Canadian jurisprudence "particularly helpful," not only because
of the structural similarities between the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
and the South African Bill of Rights, but because of the Supreme Court of Canada's
"persuasive reasoning. '
Justice Kentridge discussed three decisions of the Canadian Supreme Court in
some detail, and drew three propositions out of them.2 6 First, he quoted a lengthy
passage from one judgment which articulated the central purposes underlying the
presumption of innocence and the nature of the protection it provides: given the
grave social and personal consequences which befall an individual accused of a
crime, the accused ought to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.' Second, Justice Kentridge noted that the Canadian decisions
had reasoned that reverse onus provisions created the danger of convicting an
accused despite a reasonable doubt, because a presumption could only be rebutted
by proof on a balance of probabilities.' Third, he remarked that the Canadian
decisions had rejected the American standard for the constitutionality of reverse
onus provisions-that there be a rational connection between the facts proved and
presumed-on the ground that that standard would still permit convictions despite
a reasonable doubt (this likely explains why he summarily rejected the American
approach earlier in his reasons). 9
Concluding his discussion of the Canadian material, Justice Kentridge simply
stated, "[a]ccordingly, I consider that we may appropriately apply the principles
worked out by the Canadian Supreme Court."13 He then proceeded to apply those
principles to the impugned South African provision. The South African Bill of
Rights, like the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, required the state to
prove an accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The impugned provision
violated the presumption of innocence, because an accused could only displace the
onus by disproving the voluntariness of his or her confession on the balance of
probabilities."'
Justice Kentridge's reliance on legal principles articulated by a foreign court is
all the more striking when one considers what he did not say. Earlier in his reasons,
Justice Kentridge had pointed to the erosion of the presumption of innocence under
apartheid, by both statute and judicial decisions.' But he did not exploit the
interpretive opportunity that his historical observation opened up-that is, he did
123. Id
124. Id. at 654.
125.Id.
126. See id. at 654-56. These decisions are Regina v. Downey [1992] 2 S.C.R. 10; Regina v.
Whyte [1988] 2 S.C.R. 3; and Regina v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
127.SeeZwna, 1995 (2) SALR at 655 (citing Regina v.Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103,115-16).
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. Ia at 656.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 650.
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not urge that the South African Bill of Rights be interpreted so as to never repeat
the errors of the past. Justice Kentridge could have charted the effect of the erosion
of the presumption of innocence on the quality of justice under apartheid. 33 Based
on that historical experience, he could have fashioned an interpretation of both the
purposes behind, and the content of, the guarantee of the presumption of innocence
that would ensure that that chapter of South African legal history would never be
repeated. However, instead of looking inward to South Africa's historical
experience, Justice Kentridge looked outward, and bound South African
jurisprudence into a web of principle transcending national boundaries.
Zuma dealt with the constitutionality of provisions that reversed the onus of proof
for the essential element of an offense. However, it expressly left open the question
of whether the right to be presumed innocent was violated by provisions that
reversed the onus of proof for an exemption or exception for a defense. This point
later provoked a lively debate in Coetzee, in which a divided court held that the
latter class of reverse onus provisions did violate the South African Bill of
Rights.'34 Interestingly, the Canadian Supreme Court had divided on the very same
issue, although it eventually came to the position later taken in South Africa. The
Constitutional Court, once again, engaged in a detailed discussion of the Canadian
case law. 3' Its stated reason for doing so was that the parties had relied extensively
on competing strands of the Canadian jurisprudence. 36 However, the divided nature
of the Canadian authorities would have been a good reason to ignore them
altogether. The better explanation for the court's comparative approach is that it
viewed the Canadian jurisprudence as a repository of transcendent legal principles.
Speaking for the majority in Coetzee, Justice Langa largely confined his analysis
to a detailed discussion of the two lines of Canadian authority. One set of cases
stood for the proposition that the presumption of innocence was not violated by
reverse onus provisions which applied to defenses, 37 while the second, and later,
set of decisions came to the opposite conclusion. 3 ' Neither line of cases had been
overruled. Justice Langa made two moves to align himself with the latter body of
cases. First, he distinguished the earlier decisions on their facts, noting that the
Supreme Court of Canada, in those decisions, had concluded that the impugned
provisions did not reverse the onus of proof. Strictly speaking, the constitutional
issue had not arisen in those cases, and as a consequence, they were not on point.
39
Second, and more importantly, he stated that he "preferred".the approach of the
133. David Dyzenhaus has recently argued that the unwillingness of South Africanjudges to
criticize the courts' role under apartheid is in large part motivated by a desire to maintain
collegiality among members of the current bench, who were appointed both during and after the
apartheid era. DAVID DYzE.NHAus, JUDGrING THE JUDGES, JUDGING OunsELvEs: TRUTH,
RECONCILIATION AND THE APARTHEID LEGAL ORDER 38-39 (1998).
134. State v. Coetzee, 1997 (3) SALR 527 (CC).
135. See id. at 545.
136. See id.
137. See Reginav. Schwartz [1988] 2 S.C!L 443,469; Regina v. Holmes [1988] 1 S.C!R 914,
948.
138. See generallyRegina v. Keegstra [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697; Regina v. Whyte [1988] 2 S.C!R
3.
139. See Coetzee, 1997 (3) SALR at 545.
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later decisions. 4 ° It seems that his preference was based on the reasoning of the
later decisions. Justice Langa quoted at length from a Supreme Court of Canada
judgment in which the court explained that for the purposes of the presumption of
innocence, whether a reverse onus attached to the essential element of an offense
or a defense, etc., was of no constitutional consequence. Rather, "'[i]t is the final
effect of [the] provision on the verdict that is decisive."'"" Thus, for the Supreme
Court of Canada, the possibility of conviction despite a reasonable doubt was
dispositive. Justice Langa found this reasoning convincing, and applied it mutas
mutatis to the interpretation of the South African Bill of Rights:
What matters in the end is the substance of the [offense] .... The fact that
section 332(5) [(the impugned provision)] requires that the accused director
should, on pain of conviction, prove that he or she did not take part in the
commission of the [offense] and could not have prevented others from doing so,
even if it is formulated as an exception, has the same consequences as a reverse
onus provision which relates to an essential element of the offence 42
The dissent's response (per Justice Kentridge) is revealing, because it too relied
on Canadian jurisprudence as a source of interpretive principle. Discussing the
Supreme Court of Canada judgments that Justice Langa had distinguished, Justice
Kentridge drew from them a proposition diametrically opposed to the one applied
by Justice Langa-that the presumption of innocence was not violated by a
provision reversing the onus of proof for a defense. According to Justice Kentridge,
the reason for this conclusion offered by these Canadian decisions was that the
prosecution was required to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt without the
benefit of the presumption, before any defenses could be raised.'43 Justice Kentridge
quoted a Canadian judge's view that if an individual accused under such a provision
"is convicted in the face of such a defence, it is not because he has been presumed
guilty or because the commission of the crime has not been shown, but because his
excuse was rejected after proof of the commission of the offence."' 44 Justice
Kentridge simply added that he found "this approach highly convincing and very
much in point."' 4
The significance of Coetzee lies in the structure, rather than in the subject-matter,
of the disagreement between the majority and the dissent. Given the divided nature
of the Canadian case law, one could have expected both the judges and the parties
to avoid it altogether. Yet the majority regarded the Canadian judgments as a
valuable interpretive resource, because they articulated legal principles that,
although framed in connection with the construction of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, were of direct legal relevance to the South African Bill of
Rights. Similarly, the fact that Justice Kentridge in dissent chose to attack the
majority's reasoning with legal principles drawn from another line of Canadian case
law demonstrates how he joined battle with the majority on the terrain of
universalist interpretation. He felt that legal principles could best be countered with
140. Id.
141. Id. at 544 (quoting Whyte [1988] 2 S.C. at 18).
142. Id. at 545 (emphasis omitted).
143. See id. at 566.
144. Id. (quoting Regina v. Holmes [1988] 1 S.C.R. 914, 948.)
145.Id.
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competing legal principles. This explains why Justice Kentridge chose neither to
emphasize the inapplicability of Canadian jurisprudence to the interpretation of the
South African Constitution, nor to attack the Canadian cases relied on by the
majority with arguments of principle from academic commentators. Both the
majority and dissenting judgments in Coetzee are vivid examples of universalist
interpretation.'"
146. Universalist interpretation also played an important role in the South African Constitutional
Court's unanimous decision in Shabalala v. Attorney-General, Transvaal, 1996 (1) SALR 725
(CC). The narrow legal issue in that case was whether a common law privilege enjoyed by criminal
prosecutors over witnesses' statements violated an accused's right to a fair trial. Deputy President
Mahomed, speaking for the court, began his analysis by outlining the content of the right to a fair
trial. See id at 732-33. His reasons make clear that he believed the court to be interpreting a right
that South Africa shared with other countries, and hence whose interpretation was governed by
a seamless body of principles that transcended national borders. For instance, he referred to foreign
jurisprudence, very matter-of-factly, as "cases [which] illustrate the application of the right to a fair
trial"Ida at 743 n.56. Deputy President Mahomed then cited a series ofjudgments decided under,
inter alia, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 5, and the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention], without even a perfunctory caution that those
were foreign decisions, see Shabalala, 1996 (1) SALR at 743 n.56.
Deputy President Mahomed concluded that the right to a fair trial granted a right of access to
information held by the police (called the "police docket"); however, the extent of the right of
access depended on the facts of the case. See id. at 743. He then analyzed the constitutionality of
the blanket common law privilege attaching to witnesses' statements. The structure and the
sources of his argument are significant He scrutinized the common law rule through arguments
of principle, pro and con. Moreover, these arguments, and his responses to them, were to a great
extent drawn from foreign judgments, which Deputy President Mahomed again simply referred
to as "cases." Id. at 746. For example, Deputy President Mahomed cited a Supreme Court of
Canada judgment for the objection that a duty of disclosure would impose too onerous a burden
on the prosecution, and cause delays in bringing the accused to a trial. See id. at 747 (citing Regina
v. Stinchcombe [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326, 334). But he then rejected this argument by relying on
arguments drawn from, inter alia, the same judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada, noting, for
example, that comprehensive disclosure might in fact reduce trial delay by inducing more guilty
pleas. See id. at 748 (citing Stinchcombe [1991] 3 S.C.R. at 334). In conclusion, Shabalala is
another good example of the use of universalist methodology. Its reliance on arguments of
principle from foreign jurisprudence, and its implicit claim that those principles are transcendent,
are both central tenets of universalist methodology.
Another example ofthe reliance on foreign jurisprudence through universalist interpretation can
be found in Justice Ackermann's judgment in Bernstein v. Bester, 1996 (2) SALR 751,758-808
(CC). The issue there was a challenge to the constitutionality of a provision of South African
bankruptcy legislation governing inquiries to be made in the wake of a declaration of bankruptcy.
See id at 758. The legislation (1) authorized the official conducting the inquiry to summon, inter
alia, any officer or director, and (2) placed persons so summoned under a legal duty to answer any
question and to disclose any relevant documentary information. The relevant provision was
challenged as a violation of the right to privacy, guaranteed by section 13 of the Interim
Constitution. See id. at 764.
Given the absence of a complete factual record, none of the members of the court reached the
constitutional issue. Nevertheless, Justice Ackermanm offered "some preliminary observations on
the scope of'the right to privacy. d at 787. After dealing with philosophical literature on the right
to privacy, and the protection of privacy interests by South African common law, Justice
Ackermann moved seamlessly, and without precautionary comment, to a discussion of the
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C. Complex Universalism: Makwanyane
Courts which employ the universalist mode of comparative constitutional
interpretation face considerable difficulty when they encounter foreign judgments
that have arrived at conclusions which differ from the one they propose. The natural
response would be to distinguish those decisions in some way, so as to undermine
their precedential force. However, some rationales for distinguishing comparative
case law may be in tension with the central tenets of universalist methodology.
Rather than merely limiting the relevance of those contrary decisions, distinguishing
them may potentially throw into question the justification for looking to
comparative law at all.
One possible rationale for distinguishing comparative jurisprudence would be
that the foreign court relied on legal principles which differ from those applicable
to the interpretation of the constitution at hand. This would certainly be consistent
with the notion of transcendence, because universalist interpretation (despite its
name) makes no claim to universality. However, acknowledging that foreign courts
can coherently rely on arguments of principle that go the other way would make the
jurisprudence ofthe European Court of Human Rights, the United States Supreme Court, and the
Supreme Court of Canada. See id. at 790-98. The right to privacy in the South African
Constitution is textually unqualified. However, Ackermann drew out of the foreign jurisprudence
the proposition that the right to privacy only protected a reasonable expectation of privacy, a
principle which he believed should govern the interpretation of the South African provision as well.
See id. at 793.
Justice Ackermann's discussion of the foreign jurisprudence in Bernstein is notable for two
reasons. The first is that Justice Ackermann used comparative case law not only to introduce the
notion of reasonable expectation into the heart of the privacy guarantee, but also to give texture to
that notion in a careful and step-by-step fashion. Thus, from the European jurisprudence, he
derived the idea that persons who voluntarily enter the public realm have no reasonable expectation
of privacy, from the American case law, the notion that the test of reasonableness was both
subjective and objective; and finally, from the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada, the
principle that the objective test for reasonableness should take into account the state's interest in
law enforcement. See id. at 787-94. Bernstein provides a vivid example of how a complex web
of doctrine can add subtlety and depth to a textually unembellished guarantee.
ButBernstein is also important for another reason, which is best understood by looking at the
placement of Justice Ackermana's discussion of comparative case law within the body of his
opinion. He first turned to philosophical writings on privacy, citing Rainer Forst, How Not to Speak
About Identity: The Concept of a Person in a Theory ofJustice, 18 PHIL. & Soc. CRITIQUE 1
(1992), and Michael J. Sandel, TheProceduralRepublic andthe Unencumbered Self, 12 POL.
TBEORY 81 (1984), and then turned to comparative jurisprudence. He broughtthese two sources
together, when he stated that comparative jurisprudence "seems to accord with" the analysis
derived from an examination of philosophical texts, namely that "the nature of the privacy
implicated by the 'right to privacy' relates only to the most personal aspects of a person's
[experience], and not to every aspect within his [or] her personal knowledge and experience."
Bernstein, 1996 (2) SALR at 787, 795. What is critical here is not Justice Ackermann's
substantive conclusion so much as his interpretive methodology. The unarticulated premise of his
argument is that principles drawn from philosophy have little authoritative force on their own, but
when shown to be legal principles, they take on legal significance, and, as a consequence, can be
woven into constitutional interpretation as sources of comparative insight Once again, this aspect
of Justice Ackermann's opinion applies and reflects a commitment to the tenets of universalist
methodology.
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claim of transcendence less convincing. Emphasizing constitutional difference
contributes to the impression that principles are particular and local, rather than
global and transnational.
One way to avoid this uncomfortable implication would be to offer another
rationale for distinguishing foreign jurisprudence. The claim here would be that
those contrary judgments were arrived at under constitutions that differ textually
(either explicitly or implicitly) from the one under consideration, and that those
textual differences dictate legal outcomes for questions which are textually open
under the constitution at hand. But this rationale raises problems of its own. It sits
uncomfortably with the idea that the law is- best understood as a body of principles,
rather than as a collection or even a system of formal rules of law. As a
consequence, it undermines the idea that foreign jurisprudence is a valuable source
of legal insight because it articulates legal principles; retreating into text contradicts
the anti-positivist tendencies of universalist jurisprudence.
Perhaps unwittingly, the Constitutional Court of South Africa has, on at least one
occasion, distinguished foreign precedents in a manner that avoids these difficulties.
Indeed, not only did the court's approach not erode the tenets of universalist
interpretation, it actually reinforced them. The court's strategy consisted of two
interpretive moves. The first move was to explain foreign judgments which were
opposed to the court's desired course as solely a function of text; at the outset, this
ruled out the possibility that differences in outcome were a product of differences
in principle. That initial assertion was made alongside another: that text operated
as a limit on the underlying principles which constituted the heart of the law, and
did not eliminate the presence of principle altogether. Text, in other words,
derogated from principle, but did not supplant it. Moreover, those legal principles
were transcendent. These premises forced the conclusion that "but for" textual
differences, the law would have been the same across the jurisdictions being
compared. Thus, rather than throwing into question both the existence and the
importance of transcendent legal principles, the court explained foreign decisions
in a way that preserved, but qualified, principle's role.
The most contentious premise in the above argument is that transcendent
principles exist alongside constitutional text. That premise ',as supplied by the
second interpretive move, which demonstrated that notwithstanding textual
language which appeared to preclude recourse to transcendent legal principles,
those principles had had concrete legal effects. The ability of principles to
overcome textual language illustrated two points: first, that principles mattered to
legal reasoning, and second, that those principles were sufficiently important to be
regarded as transcendent.
The Constitutional Court made both of these moves in Makwanyane, in which the
court held the imposition of the death penalty to be unconstitutional." 7 The leading
judgment, concurred in by all members of the court, was given by President
Chaskalson. President Chaskalson framed the issue as whether the death penalty
amounted to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment, though, in the interpretation
147. State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391 (CC).
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of that provision, he also considered related guarantees such as the right to life.'48
A great deal of the judgment dealt with comparative jurisprudence, not only from
other constitutional democracies, but also from bodies adjudicating upon
international and regional human rights instruments. That body of case law posed
a problem for the Constitutional Court, because in general, it had upheld the legality
or constitutionality of the death penalty. However, rather than ignoring those
decisions altogether, the court dealt with that jurisprudence in enormous detail,
through the two interpretive moves I have described.
First, when discussing comparative jurisprudence, the court was careful to
emphasize that it was the texts of the various constitutional and international
documents it considered that had led foreign courts and international tribunals to
uphold the death penalty. The court's unstated implication throughout is that had
those texts been the same as in the South African Bill of Rights, those tribunals or
courts would have ruled capital punishment illegal. 49 For example, in his extensive
discussion of American constitutional jurisprudence, President Chaskalson's central
point was that "[f]rom the beginning, the U.S. Constitution recognized capital
punishment as lawful."' This authorization was implied, and was reflected in a
number of different provisions. Thus, the Fifth Amendment "refers in specific terms
to capital punishment and impliedly recognizes its validity," and the Fourteenth
Amendment also "impliedly recognizes the rights of states to make laws for such
purposes."' President Chaskalson also noted that the question of textual
authorization was "stressed in some of the judgments of the United States Supreme
Court,"5 2 and had led to the conclusion that the death penalty did not amount to
cruel and unusual punishment for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment. The
notion of implied authorization also predominated in President Chaskalson's
explanation of the Indian Supreme Court's jurisprudence, which dealt with the right
to life. He noted in particular the provisions of the Indian Constitution dealing with
the commuting of death sentences and the powers of the Supreme Court in death
148. The right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment was found in
section 11(2) of the Interim Constitution; the right to life was guaranteed by section 9. Irmgnv
S.AFR. CONST., supra note 70, §§ 9,11(2).
149. An important component in the court's decision was that the drafters of the Interim
Constitution had declined to resolve the constitutionality of the death penalty, and left this question
for the Constitutional Court to resolve.
In the constitutional negotiations which followed, the issue was not resolved.
Instead, the "Solomonic solution"was adopted. The death sentence was, in terms,
neither sanctioned nor excluded, and it was left to the Constitutional Court to decide
whether the provisions of the pre-constitutional law making the death penalty a
competent sentence for murder and other crimes are consistent with chaptter] 3 of
the Constitution [(i.e., the Bill of Rights)].
Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 409 (Chaskalson, P.) (footnote omitted). This distinguished the
SouthAfrican Constitution from the various documents, both foreign and international, considered
by President Chaskalson in his judgment, which had resolved the constitutionality of the death
penalty. See id. at 412-14.
150. Id. at415.
151.Id.
152.Id at416 (citing Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
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penalty appeals.153 President Chaskalson also emphasized that the "wording of the
relevant provisions of our Constitution are different.' 54
-In some of the instruments President Chaskalson looked at, the authorization for
the death penalty was in fact express. The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ("ICCPR"), for example, explicitly authorizes the death penalty,'55
and for President Chaskalson, it was "in view of' and "because of' these provisions
that the United Nations Human Rights Committee found that the extradition of a
suspected murderer to a jurisdiction where he might face the death penalty did not
violate the right to life.'56 Likewise, the express provisions in the European
Convention authorizing capital punishment explained, for President Chaskalson,
why the European Court of Human Rights could not find the death penalty per se
illegal simply because it contravened the right not to be subjected to torture or
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 57
However, despite the implied and express textual authorizations for the death
penalty in other constitutions and in international human rights instruments,
President Chaskalson identified a consistent tendency to provide some legal
protection to persons facing the death penalty. Thus, he noted that "notwithstanding
the sanction given to capital punishment" in the express terms of the ICCPR, the
United Nations Human Rights Committee nevertheless evaluated the manner of
execution to determine whether it amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. 5 '
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights assessed "the manner in which [the
death penalty] is imposed or executed, the personal circumstances of the
condemned person and the disproportionality to the gravity of the crime committed,
as well as the conditions of detention awaiting execution" to find particular
impositions of capital punishment to constitute torture or inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. 59 Likewise, the Indian Supreme Court has set aside a
death sentence because the delay in carrying it out was too great. 60 President
Chaskalson also noted that the United States Supreme Court continued to police the
153. The leading Indian judgment is Bachan Singh v. State ofPunjab, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 898.
154.Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 428.
155. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
156.Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 424, 425. The decisions of the United Nations Human
Rights Committee discussed by President Chaskalson are Ng v. Canada, Communication No.
469/1991, U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/491D/469/1991 (1994), and Kindler v. Canada, Communication
No. 470/1991, U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991 (1994). The relevant articles of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are articles 6 (the right to life) and 7 (the right
to not be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment). ICCPR, supra note
155, arts. 6, 7.
157. See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 425 (discussing articles 2 and 3 of the European
Convention, supra note 146). The decision of the European Court of Human Rights is Soering
v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
158. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 424.
159. Id. at 425-26.
160. See id. at 429. President Chaskalson cited the decisions of the Indian Supreme Court in
Daya Singh v. Union oflndia, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1548, and Triveniben v. State of Gujarat, A.I.
1989 S.C. 1335.
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death penalty constitutionally, by requiring that sentencing discretion be neither too
broad and unstructured nor entirely absent.""
The lesson President Chaskalson drew from this comparative experience is
summarized in the following passage of his judgment:
The fact that in both the United States and India, which sanction capital
punishment, the highest Courts have intervened on constitutional grounds in
particular cases to prevent the carrying out of death sentences, because in the
particular circumstances of such cases, it would have been cruel to do so,
evidences the importance attached to the protection of life and the strict
scrutiny to which the imposition and carrying out of death sentences are
subjected when a constitutional challenge is raised. The same concern is
apparent in the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and the
United Nations Committee on Human Rights.'6
A number of points emerge from this passage. First, President Chaskalson identified
an overarching principle, "the protection of life."' Second, he noted that that
principle had played a critical role in all the judgments he had discussed, which
made it both a legal principle and a transcendent one. Third, this principle existed
alongside and even in tension with textual provisions which had not eliminated or
supplanted it; this was proof of how principles not tied to formal legal sources
could nevertheless remain important and integral components of the law.
Substantively, the existence of "the protection of life" as a transcendent legal
principle helped President Chaskalson conclude that the death penalty amounted to
cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment. 64 But taken together, these points also
show how President Chaskalson's careful discussion of conflicting comparative
jurisprudence ultimately reinforced universalist methodology instead of
undermining it.
IV. D LoGIcAL INTERPRETATION
A. Introduction
Although universalist interpretation plays an important role in the use of
comparative jurisprudence in constitutional interpretation, it is not the only way in
which comparative law is used. In this Part, I discuss dialogical interpretation, a
second interpretive methodology also well exemplified by a series of judgments of
the Constitutional Court of South Africa, though by no means limited to that
jurisdiction. Engaging in dialogical interpretation, the court held that the Bill of
161. SeeMakwanyane, 1995 (3) SAIR at 416. President Chaskalson cited the following United
States Supreme Court judgments which struck down death penalty statutes for imposing
mandatory death sentences, and/or for not considering any mitigating factors: Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586 (1978); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976). He also cited Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979), as an example of the Court
striking down a death penalty statute where the sentencing discretion was too broad.
162. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 430 (emphasis added).
163. Id.
164. See id. at 451-52.
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Rights under the Interim Constitution did not apply to litigation between private
parties pursuant to the common law. 6" The court also found that the Interim
Constitution permitted the National Parliament to require provincial executives to
implement national legislation.1" Dialogical interpretation also played an important
role in Justice Sachs's dissent in a decision upholding the prohibition of liquor sales
on the Christian Sabbath,'67 and in obiter dicta comments in another case
suggesting that some provisions of the Interim Constitution may have been beyond
constitutional amendment. 68
Dialogical interpretation is intriguing, because it has been used in cases in which
the Constitutional Court emphasized that the South African Constitution is a unique
document that requires a unique interpretation, yet in the same breath discussed
foreign jurisprudence in considerable detail. Thus, while Justice Kriegler asserted
that "when all is said and done, the answer to the question before us is to be sought,
first and last, in the Constitution,"'6 9 and President Chaskalson proclaimed that the
powers of the South African Parliament depended ultimately upon "'the language
of the Constitution, construed in the light of [our] own history,"".7 they
nevertheless looked to foreign constitutional experiences, and comparative
jurisprudence, in order to better understand particular provisions in the South
African Constitution.
Dialogical interpretation is all the more intriguing when one appreciates that it
is a reaction against universalist interpretation, which is characterized by the free
and easy use of comparative jurisprudence. In Bernstein v. Bester, for example,
although he concurred with Justice Ackermann in the result, Justice Kriegler went
out ofhis way to "discourage the frequent-and, I suspect, often facile-resort to
foreign 'authorities"' and the "blithe 'adoption of alien concepts or inapposite
precedents."' 7  Justice Kriegler's comments could be read to suggest that
comparative case law should not play any role in constitutional adjudication, yet in
some of his judgments it does, and in a very significant way.
The heart of dialogical interpretation lies in a recognition of what a claim to
constitutional difference actually means. Difference is an inherently relative
concept; a constitution is only unique by comparison to other constitutions that
share some feature or characteristic which that constitution does not. The inclusion
of a general limitations clause, for example, was a distinct feature of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms' only because other constitutions had not been
165. See Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1996 (3) SALR 850 (CC).
166. See Ex Parte Speaker of the National Assembly: In Re Dispute Concerning the
Constitutionality of Certain Provisions of the National Education Policy Bill 83 of 1995, 1996 (3)
SALR 289 (CC).
167. See State v. Solberg, 1997"(4) SALR 1176, 1220-42 (CC).
168. See Premier, Kwazulu-Natal v. President ofthe Republic of South Africa, 1996 (1) SALR
769,784 (CC).
169. Du Plessis, 1996 (3) SALR at 911.
170. National Education Policy Bill, 1996 (3) SALR at 301 (quoting Executive Council,
Western Cape Legislature v. President of the Republic of South Africa, 1995 (4) SALR 877,904
(CC) (alteration in original)).
171. 1996 (2) SALR 751, 811-12 (CC).
172. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 5, § 1.
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drafted in that way. Moreover, since difference is defined in comparative terms, it
follows that a keener awareness and a better understanding of difference can be
achieved through a process of comparison. In this way, the use of comparative
jurisprudence, far from being in tension with a commitment to constitutional
difference, may in fact both acknowledge it and even enhance an awareness of it,
if it is used in the correct way.
Dialogical interpretation achieves this goal through three interpretive steps.
17 3
The first step is to use comparative jurisprudence as a means to identify important
assumptions, both factual and normative, that underlie the interpreting court's own
constitutional order. There are a number of moves to this argument. The court
examines comparative case law and doctrine, not primarily to gain an accurate
picture of the state of the law in the other jurisdiction, but rather to identify the
assumptions that lie underneath it. Mayo Moran has perceptively argued, for
example, that beneath the American case law on hate speech lies a fear of a
totalitarian state and a highly individualistic conception of the meaning of
freedom. 74 In the process of articulating the assumptions of foreign jurisprudence,
though, a court will inevitably uncover its own. By asking why foreign courts have
reasoned a certain way, a court will surely ask itself why it reasons the way it does;
comparative jurisprudence serves as an interpretive foil. As Brenda Cossman
suggests, "[T]he flow of analysis and comparison can begin to shift ... by turning
the gaze of comparison back on itself.' 75
At the second step, the court compares the assumptions underlying domestic and
comparative jurisprudence, and engages in a process of justification. As Moran
states, "[o]ur own rhetorical choices, which inevitably privilege certain points of
view and make others implausible, become matters to be discussed and justified
rather than simply assumed."' 76 If the assumptions are different, the question
becomes why they are different. It is now possible to ask this question because the
court's own constitution and case law has been made "strange" to it, by contrasting
it with a different constitutional world. 7 The types of reasons offered will be
diverse, ranging from constitutional structure and history to the "substantive
reasons" familiar to courts employing the universalist methodology. Glendon, for
example, suggests that Canadian courts should be reluctant to rely on American
jurisprudence on the right to abortion, because the latter reflects an "extreme form]
of individualism and neutrality" which stands at odds with Canadian understandings
of the relationship between the individual and the community.178 A court must ask
whether that is a fair claim to make. Although the starting point of dialogical
interpretation is constitutional difference, a court must also be open to the
possibility that it will instead discover constitutional similarity. But nevertheless,
even if the assumptions are similar, one can still ask why-that is, whether those
173. 1 owe a particular debt to Mayo Moran's article, supra note 25, for helping me to identify
the moves in this argument.
174. Id. at 1442-51.
175. Brenda Cossman, Turning the Gaze Back on tsef: Comparative Law, Feminist Legal
Studies, and the Postcolonial Project, 1997 UTAHL. REv. 525, 536.
176. Moran, supra note 25, at 1498.
177. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 54, at 1005.
178. Olendon, Canadian Abortion Decision, supra note 71, at 571, 590.
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assumptions ought to be shared. A similarity in constitutional assumptions should
not be considered fixed and immutable.
At the final stage, the court is faced with a set of interpretive choices. After
reflection, a court may be able to justify either the similarity with, or the difference
between, the factual and normative assumptions at the base of its constitutional
regime, and the corresponding assumptions it identifies in comparative
jurisprudence. Dialogical interpretation, then, leads to a heightened sense of legal
self-awareness through interpretive confrontation and clarification. In cases of
constitutional difference, if the court rejects foreign assumptions and affirms its
own, the value of this exercise has been to heighten its awareness and
understanding of constitutional difference, which in turn, will shape and guide
constitutional interpretation. Conversely, in cases of constitutional similarity, if
similarity once identified is embraced, dialogical interpretation grounds the
legitimacy of importing comparative jurisprudence and applying it as law.
But the identification and attempted justification of constitutional assumptions
through comparison may lead a court to challenge and reject those assumptions and
search for new ones. In cases of constitutional similarity, a court may reject shared
assumptions and stake out a new interpretive approach proceeding from radically
different premises. Dialogical interpretation precipitates a shift from constitutional
similarity to constitutional difference. In cases of constitutional difference,
meanwhile, a court may determine that difference to be unfounded. Comparison
with a different constitutional perspective exposes one's assumptions as contingent,
a first step to interpretive change.'" This new-found similarity, in turn, makes
comparative jurisprudence a resource for constitutional interpretation. In either
case, if the legal point is settled, the process of dialogic interpretation can lead the
court to fundamentally re-assess its previous judgments, and to use comparative
jurisprudence as a means to initiate radical legal change.
179. The power of comparative constitutional experience to prompt a re-evaluation of
constitutional assumptions is illustrated by Justice Breyer's dissenting reasons in Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 976-78 (1997). The issue in that appeal was whether federal law could
compel state and local government officials to implement federal regulatory policy. See id. at 902.
The majority ofhe Cour, per Justice Scalia, answered this question in the negative, arguing, inter
alia, that the federd structure of the American Constitution contemplated a regime of dual
sovereignty, with states and the federal government regulating citizens, not each other. See id. at
918-22. According to Justice Scalia, this understanding of the nature of the federal scheme
followed ineluctably from the premise underlying American federalism-the protection of
individual liberty by dividing sovereignty. See id. at 919-22. Justice Breyer accepted this premise,
but disputed the conclusion that the majority drew from it He reviewed constitutional
arrangements in federations such as Germany, Switzerland, and the European Union, where
constituent states implement many federal laws. See id. at 976. From this comparative experience,
Justice Breyer drew the conclusion that"the problem of reconciling central authority with the need
to preserve the liberty-enhancing autonomy of a smaller constituent government entity" could be
better addressed by utilizing existing local bureaucracies to implement federal schemes, rather than
creating new federal bureaucracies, as the majority judgment implicitly demanded. Id. at 977.
[Vol. 74:819
1999] COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 859
B. Confronting and Clarifying Constitutional Assumptions
1. Du Plessis: The Application of the Bill of Rights
Dialogical reasoning played a pivotal role in the dissenting judgments of the
Constitutional Court of South Africa in Du Plessis v. De Klerk.'8' One of the issues
in that case was the fundamental question of whether the Bill of Rights in the
Interim Coristitution applied to the common law governing relationships between
private parties. The court divided deeply on this issue, and by a narrow majority
held that the Bill of Rights did not apply. The dissents are worth examining because
of the way in which they used comparative jurisprudence to argue that the Bill of
Rights should have applied.
The leading dissent was filed by Justice Kriegler. He began by characterizing the
judgment of the majority in a very careful way. According to Justice Kriegler, the
majority had followed the analysis of the judge below, who in turn had based his
interpretation of the relevant provisions in the South African Bill of Rights on an
"extensive review of the constitutions of other countries." " ' According to the judge
below, the general trend among liberal democracies was for bills of rights to bind
the state, but not to apply "horizontally" against private parties, and therefore "'[i]t
would ... be the correct approach to the interpretation of the Bill of Rights
provisions in chap[ter] 3 of our Constitution to take the view that our Constitution
is a conventional constitution unless there are clear indications to the contrary. "'I
Justice Kriegler's immediate and strong reaction was to reject that methodology
as wholly illegitimate, and he did so in language that resonated with legal
particularism. Stating that "my approach differs radically from" that of the courts
below and his colleagues, he made "no apology for starting the exercise by
examining the document with which we are concerned, the Constitution."' 83
However, upon closer examination, it becomes clear that his reasoning was driven
by a dialogical engagement with comparative constitutional experience.
Justice Kriegler began by identifying the assumption underlying the
"conventional" approach to bill of rights application.'84 Those documents only bind
the state because they are based on the assumption that the principal danger they
protect individuals against is the "repressive use of State power."' 85 Although
Justice Kriegler did not develop the point, his comment gestured to the theory and
practice of liberal constitutionalism, which historically arose as a response to the
arbitrary use of public authority.' However, Justice Kriegler noted, the assumption
underlying the South African Bill of Rights was different, because the sources of
180. 1996 (3) SALR 850 (CC).
181. Id. at 911.
182. Id. (quoting De Klerk v. Du Plessis, 1995 (2) SALR 40, 48 (T) (alteration added)).
183. Id.
184.Id.
185.Id.
186. See id.
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historic oppression in South Africa were both private and public." 7 He identified
that assumption by reference to the Interim Constitution's preamble and postscript,
the significance of which he defined in comparative terms. 8 Those provisions of
the Interim Constitution gestured to a South African past which was not "merely
one of repressive use of State power[,J ... [but] one of persistent, institutionalized
subjugation and exploitation of a voiceless and largely defenseless majority by a
determined and privileged minority."'8 9 The postscript made no reference to
governmental oppression, but rather referred more broadly to "untold suffering and
injustice."'O9 Taken together with the very presence of the Bill of Rights at the
beginning of the Interim Constitution, and its enumeration of equality'as the very
first right, Justice Kriegler concluded that "the fundamental rights and freedoms
have a poignancy and depth of meaning not echoed in any other national
constitution I have seen."
191
In the process of identifying those assumptions, Justice Kriegler also engaged in
their justification. In brief, he justified horizontal application by reference to South
Africa's racist past, as well as the present "stark reality of South Africa and the
power relationships in its society."'" As a consequence, the interpretive choice was
clear: "The fine line drawn by the Canadian Supreme Court... and by the U.S.
Supreme Court... between private relationships involving organs of State and
those which do not, have no place in our constitutional jurisprudence.' 1 93 But even
though Justice Kriegler's interpretation of the Bill of Rights properly recognized
that the South African Interim Constitution was unique or different, he defined this
distinctiveness in comparative terms.' 94
2. National Education Policy Bill: Federal/Provincial
Relations
Dialogical reasoning as a tool to heightening awareness of constitutional
difference played a pivotal role in the Court's decision in Ex Parte Speaker of the
National Assembly: In Re Dispute Concerning the Constitutionality of Certain
Provisions of the National Education Policy Bill 83 of 1995 ("National Education
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. Id.
190. Id. (quoting INTERIM S. AFR. CoNsT., supra note 70, postscript).
191. Id. at 912.
192. Id. at 918.
193. Id. (citations omitted).
194. The dialogical mode of reasoning appears in two other dissents in Du Plessis. Justice
Madala emphasized that the absence of horizontal application was a function of the fact that "there
were no problems in the relationships of the citizens inter se."Id. at 926 (Madala, J., dissenting).
However, since "[t]he extent of the oppressive measures in South Africa was not confined to
government/individual relations, but equally to individualimdividual relations," horizontal
application was appropriate in South Africa. Id. at 927. Likewise, Justice Sachs pointed out that
"[w]hatever function constitutions may serve in other countries, in ours it cannot properly be
understood as acting simply as a limitatioir on governmental powers and action[,] ... [g]iven the
divisions and injustices referred to in the postscript." Id. at 931 (Sachs, J., dissenting). Again,
comparative illumination played a key role in constitutional adjudication.
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PolicyBill"i)' In that case, a provincial government alleged that a national law
was unconstitutional because it obliged the provinces to adhere to and implement
national education policy.'96 On the facts, the court, per President Chaskalson,
found that the law imposed no such obligation on provincial governments.'97
Strictly speaking, then, the court did not reach *the constitutional issue.
Nevertheless, the court addressed the question of principle, and found, through a
dialogic engagement with American constitutional jurisprudence, that legislation
imposing such an obligation would have been constitutional. 198
The province put a great deal of weight on the judgment of the United States
Supreme Court in New Yorkv. United States.' In that decision, the Court had held,
in the context of legislation dealing with the disposal of radioactive waste, that it
was unconstitutional for Congress to compel the states to implement a federal
regulatory scheme.0 0 President Chaskalson made a threshold objection to the
reliance on American jurisprudence, citing an earlier judgment in which he stated
that Parliament's powers depended upon "'the language of the Constitution,
construed in the light of [our] own history"; 20 ' he later noted that "[d]ecisions of
the courts of the United States dealing with state rights are not a safe guide" for
South Africa." 2 Despite these apparently particularistic views, however, he then
reasoned dialogically to define South African federalism in juxtaposition to
American experience.
President Chaskalson explained the American decision on the basis of a certain
conception of the American founding. At a basic level, the American "Constitution
addressed a situation in which several sovereign states were brought together in a
federation."0 3 Starting as sovereigns, the states retained powers which they did not
specifically surrender to the federal government. President Chaskalson justified this
theory of American federalism by reference to specific features of the United States
Constitutional text. Most centrally, Congress was vested with specific powers, and
the Tenth Amendment reserved powers not so vested to the states. President
Chaskalson then noted that the assumptions underlying the South African division
of powers were radically different. The South African provinces "are not sovereign
states"; rather, they are creatures of "the Constitution and have only those powers
that are specifically conferred on them under the Constitution.12 4 By implication,
the objection that the national government could not compel the provinces to
implement federal policy seemed to lose its force.
195. 1996 (3) SALR 289 (CC).
196. See id. at 291-94.
197. ee id. at 304.
198. See id. at 301-02.
199.505 U.S. 144 (1992).
200. See id. at 149.
201. National Education Policy Bill, 1996 (3) SALR at 301 (quoting Executive Council,
Western Cape Legislature v. President ofthe Republic of SouthAfrica, 1995 (4) SALR 877,904
(CC) (alteration in original)).
202. Id. at 302.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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The justification of these assumptions was implicit, albeit underdeveloped, in
President Chaskalson's decision. He seemed to argue that these assumptions were
justified in the light of South African constitutional history. Thus, the interpretive
choice was clear-American jurisprudence was "not a safe guide" for the South
African courts. This conclusion was ironic, though, because American case law had
sharpened the Court's understanding of the nature of the South African division of
powers.
3. Solberg: Religious Freedom
The issue in State v. Solberg was whether the prohibition of liquor sales on
Sundays violated freedom of religion." 5 One party to the litigation challenged the
law, inter alia, on the basis that it amounted to an unconstitutional endorsement of
Christianity.0 6 That party relied on the American jurisprudence under the
Establishment Clause,207 contending that that case law stood for the proposition that
freedom of religion encompassed the notion of state non-endorsement. 2 8 The court
divided on this issue, the majority holding (per President Chaskalson) that anti-
establishment principles did not constitute part of South African constitutional
law.2°1 My focus here is on Justice Sachs's dissent, and its dialogic use of American
case law to arrive at the conclusion that the same constitutional assumptions
operated both in the United States and South Africa.
Justice Sachs's dissent is best approached through the majority judgment of
President Chaskalson. President Chaskalson refused to "read into" the religious
freedom guarantee "principles pertaining to the advancement or inhibition of
religion by the State," for a number of distinct reasons.210 One reason was an
express provision in the Bill of Rights permitting religious services to be held in
public facilities; another was the discipline imposed by the equality rights guarantee
on government activity; a third was a fear of the "far-reaching implications" of
applying anti-establishment doctrine, given the great deal of interaction between
religions and state institutions in South Africa.2 ' But both unifying and underlying
these reasons, President Chaskalson seemed to make one simple if underdeveloped
point. Although anti-establishment doctrine may be appropriate for the United
States, in South Africa, the wall of separation between church and state did not
seem to carry the same political force. South Africa would instead endorse a policy
of religious pluralism rather than neutrality, and as a consequence, a simple policy
of non-preferentialism would do.
205. 1997 (4) SALR 1176 (CC).
206. See id at 1206. The parties also argued that the law violated freedom of religion because
it compelled persons to observe the Christian Sabbath. See id. Although the court unanimously
held that compelled observance would violate the right to freedom of religion, on the facts, it found
that no such compulsion existed. See id. at 1209.
207. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
208. See Solberg, 1997 (4) SALR at 1210.
209. See id. at 1210-11.
210.Id. at 1210.
211. Id. at 1210-11.
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Justice Sachs's dissent is instructive, because it used American constitutional
doctrine to challenge this unstated but central assumption behind President
Chaskalson's majority judgment. Justice Sachs relied most heavily on the decision
of Justice O'Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly,212 and, in particular, on the following
passage:
"The second and more direct infringement [of the Establishment Clause] is
government endorsement or disapproval of religion. Endorsement sends a
message to non-adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends the
opposite message.1
213
Justice Sachs used this passage to articulate the normative claim underlying non-
endorsement: that it conflicts with a basic commitment to political equality. Thus
understood, the constitutional question was as follows: "[W]hether the prohibition
of the sale of liquor by grocery stores on Sundays amounts to such an endorsement,
thereby sending out a message that is inclusionary for some and exclusionary for
others."214 However, Justice Sachs did not accept this principle in the manner of
universalist interpretation, that is, as a transcendent norm applying across societies.
Instead, he used Lynch as an invitation to peer into South African history and
determine whether political equality was bound up with freedom of religion in a
way that justified its adoption as a constitutional principle for South Africa today.
Justice Sachs began this inquiry by noting that "[i]n the pre-constitutional era
there were a number of statutory provisions with a religious foundation that in no
way purported to maintain neutrality in relation to 'different confessional
alignments.""'21 One set of laws involved the imposition of Christian morality, for
example, through Sunday observance laws and laws dictating the content of
education. 216 But of critical importance to his analysis was the "marginalisation of
communities of Hindu and Muslim persuasion" by the South African courts. 217 He
described, referring to the writings of Mohandas K. Gandhi, the non-recognition of
Hindu and Muslim marriages, and of Muslim property law, by the South African
common law.218 The effect of these judgments was "for Hindu and Muslim norms
to be relegated to the space of the deviant [o]ther.1219 Summarizing this historical
experience, Justice Sachs concluded that "[a]ny echo today of the superior status
in public law once enjoyed by Christianity must therefore be understood as a
reminder of the subordinate position to which followers of other faiths were
formerly subjected." 221 Moreover, the close association of "[r]eligious
212.465 U.S.668 (1984).
213. Solberg, 1997 (4) SALR at 1221 (Sachs, J., dissenting) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (alteration added)).
214.Id.
215.Id. at 1226 (quoting F. D. Van der Vyver, Religion, 23 TBE LAw oF SouTHAFRIKA 197
(Joubert ed. 1986)).
216. See id. at 1226-27.
217. Id. at 1229.
218. See id. at 1227-28.
219. Id. at 1229 (internal quotation marks omitted).
220. Id.
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marginalization" and "racial discrimination" made these reminders even more
painful.22
1
As a consequence, prohibiting state endorsement as a means to political equality,
though an idea drawn from American jurisprudence, was a South African
constitutional assumption too. The dialogic use of American case law is clear
throughout his opinion; as Justice Sachs concluded, "the concern expressed by
[Justice O'Connor in Lynch] about the message sent by State endorsement of
religion to non-adherents to the effect that they are outsiders and not full members
of the political community has special resonance in South Africa."'222
C. Challenging and Rejecting Assumptions: Premier of
KwaZulu-Natal and the Power of Constitutional
Amendment
As I mentioned above, dialogical reasoning can destabilize well-established
assumptions that seem beyond legal dispute, thus precipitating a shift from
constitutional difference to constitutional similarity. An example of this power of
dialogical reasoning is the judgment of the Constitutional Court in Premier,
KwaZulu-Natal v. President of the Republic of South Africa.23 At issue there was
the legality of amendments to provisions of the Interim Constitution governing the
transitional arrangements for local government. 224 In addressing this question, the
court examined a controversial line of Indian jurisprudence which forced it to re-
examine the exhaustiveness of the text of the Interim Constitution.225
The constitutional amendments had been enacted in accordance with the
procedures laid down in the Interim Constitution.226 The basis of the constitutional
attack was that despite the compliance with formal procedures, the amendments
were unconstitutional because they had not been made "within the 'spirit' of the
Constitution.' 227 This attack was based on a line of Indian decisions which had
struck down amendments to the Indian Constitution enacted through the correct
procedures. 228 The test laid down by the Indian Supreme Court was whether the
amendment would "damage or destroy the essential elements or basic features of
the Constitution." 229 The assumption underlying this line of cases was that "the
power of amendment does not include the power to destroy or abrogate the basic
structure or framework of the Constitution. ' 23 ' But this principle only makes sense
if one accepts the existence of extra-textual norms that exist both alongside and
221. Id.
222. Id. (emphasis added). Justice Sachs went on to hold that the law had been enacted for
religious purposes and hence violated freedom of religion, but was justified because it promoted
a public interest in safety. See id. at 1241-42.
223. 1996 (1) SALR 769 (CC).
224. See id. at 772.
225. See id. at 784.
226. See id. at 783-84.
227. Id. at 783.
228. See id. at 784.
229. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, A.IR. 1975 S.C. 2299,2461.
230. Id. (Chandrachud, J.).
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prior to the written Indian Constitution. The Indian Supreme Court has found that
"the supremacy of the Constitution itself, the rule of law, the principle of equality,
the independence of the judiciary and judicial review are all basic features of the
Indian Constitution which cannot be so amended."
23 1
The response to this argument of Deputy President Mahomed, speaking for the
court, was revealing. On the one hand, he expressed some skepticism that there
were implied limits on the power of constitutional amendment. Deputy President
Mahomed simply stated that "[t]here is a procedure which is prescribed for
amendments to the Constitution. ",1 2 The assumption underlying this statement is
that the textual provisions of the Interim Constitution were exhaustive. This, in turn,
was most likely based on the belief in the supremacy of the written constitution,
which itself probably recognized two important ideas: the sanctity of the agreement
arrived at by the parties to the constitutional negotiations, and the anchoring of the
legitimacy of the judicial role through the interpretation of a set of written norms.
On the other hand, Deputy President Mahomed did not rule out the possibility of
adopting the Indian approach in a future case. Thus, he stated that, on the facts, it
was unnecessary to pursue the matter further, because the impugned amendment
could not "conceivably fall within this category of amendments so basic to the
Constitution as effectively to abrogate or destroy it. '23 3 Another member of the
court, speaking extra-judicially, has stated that the question remains open.234 It
seems that the Indian jurisprudence has forced the Constitutional Court to question
a basic assumption-that is, that the Constitution solely consists of written, and not
unwritten, norms.
23 5
231.Premier, KwaZulu-Natal, 1996 (1) SALR at 784 (internal quotation marks and footnotes
omitted) (citing Gupta v. President of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149; State of Rajasthan v. Union of
India, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1361; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, A.IR. 1975 S.C. 2299;
Kesavanada Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461).
232. Id. at 783.
233. Id. at 784.
234. See Justice Albie Sachs, The Creation of South Africa's Constitution, A Discussion with
the Audience (Oct. 1996), in 41 N.Y.L. Sc. L. REv. 685, 691-92 (1997) (The Federalist Society
Conference: Civil Justice and the Litigation Process: Do the Merits and the Search for Truth
Matter Anymore?).
235. Dialogical reasoning played a prominent role in the majority judgment in Executive
Counci Westen Cape Legislature v. President of the Republic of South Africa, 1995 (4) SALR
877 (CC). There, the narrow question was whether the National Parliament could delegate to the
President the authority to amend and even repeal legislation. See id. at 884. The court, per
President Chaskalson, answered the question in the negative, relying on the separation of powers.
See id. at 904-05. However, it defined the version of that concept that operated in South Africa
through a lengthy discussion of comparative jurisprudence. See id. at 898-905.
President Chaskalson's strategy was to sketch two different constitutional traditions with respect
to the separation of powers, and then to align South Africa with one and not the other. See id.
Thus, his use of dialogical reasoning simultaneously heightened an awareness of both
constitutional difference and constitutional similarities. On the one hand, were jurisdictions like
the United States and Ireland, which policed the separation of powers between the legislative and
executive branches rather strictly. President Chaskalson examined the case law of those
jurisdictions, and drew out the proposition that delegations of legislative power were permissible
but subject to two principal constraints: a delegated authority could not make law, and it had to
work within the principles and policies of the statute. See id. at 900. On the other hand, were
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V. GENEALOGICAL INTERPRETATION
A. Introduction
Finally, I turn to the genealogical mode of comparative constitutional
interpretation. I explore this type of reasoning through the use by Canadian courts
of American jurisprudence on both the constitutional status of Indian nations and
Indian rights to land. 36 At present, the most relevant site for the Canadian use of
American jurisprudence is section 35(1) of Canada's Constitution Act, 1982."
That provision explicitly affirms and recognizes "existing aboriginal rights."2 38 On
its face, it does not provide any guidance on identifying and defining which existing
rights aboriginal peoples have. However, a series of decisions written by Chief
Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court in the early nineteenth century
has offered answers to that very question, and as a result has heavily influenced the
Commonwealth jurisdictions like Australia and Canada, which "seem to take a broader view of the
power to delegate legislative authority."Id Reviewing the case law of those jurisdictions, President
Chaskalson concluded that under those constitutional documents, legislatures could "delegate
plenary law-making powers to the Executive, including the power to amend Acts of Parliament"
Id.
President Chaskalson then discussed the assumptions underlying the two strains of
jurisprudence. See id In the United States Constitution, there was a clear separation of powers, and
government was subject to the discipline of a written constitution. See id. at 899-900. The
constitutional structure in Commonwealth jurisdictions differed in two basic respects. First,
because ofthe English tradition of responsible government, whereby ministers of the Crown were
also members of the legislature, there was no clear separation of powers between the legislative
and executive branches. See id. at 900. Second, in Commonwealth jurisdictions, legislative bodies
are supreme, see id. at 900-01; thus President Chaskalson's implicit point is that a supreme body
is competent to delegate its powers if it so chooses.
By thus re-framing the narrow legal question before the court as a choice between two
competing and inconsistent sets of constitutional assumptions, President Chaskalson set the stage
for his decision. President Chaskalson rejected the latter set of assumptions, and by implication,
identified the South African Constitution with the former. His justification was historical and
textual. South Africa's "history, like the history of Commonwealth countries such as Australia,
India and Canada was a history of parliamentary supremacy."Id. at 904. However, the adoption
of the Interim Constitution evinced "a clear intention to break away from that history" in two
respects: first, through the adoption of a constitution which proclaimed its supremacy, and second,
through the express vesting of legislative authority with the National Parliament Id.
Doctrinally, this choice of assumptions manifested itself in the following way: although
Parliament could delegate the power to enact subordinate legislation, it could not delegate the
power to amend or repeal Acts of Parliament Dialogical interpretation had led President
Chaskalson to adopt an American-style separation of powers for South Africa.
236. In Canadian legal and political discourse, the terms "aboriginal peoples" and "First
Nations" correspond to the terms "Indian" and "Native American" in the United States. I shall use
the two sets of terms interchangeably.
237. Constitution Act, R.S.C., No. 44, § 35(1) (1982) (Can.).
238. Id.
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development of Canadian constitutional doctrine in this area.23 9 Moreover, those
decisions figure prominently in academic commentary.2 0
As I discuss below, the origins of the Canadian jurisprudence on aboriginal rights
precede the entrenchment of section 35(1) in 1982. The Supreme Court of Canada
has recently acknowledged that the "doctrine of aboriginal rights" existed at
common law prior to 1982, and that section 35(1) had the effect, inter alia, of
239. The two decisions I shall focus on are Johnson v. MIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543
(1823), and Worcesterv. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet) 515 (1832).
240. See, e.g., BRIAN SLATERY, ANCESTRAL LANDS, ALIEN LAWS: JuDIcIALPERsPECTIVES ON
ABORIGINAL TrmE 38 (1983) [hereinafter SLATTERY, ANCESTRAL LANDs] (arguing that the
Marshall decisions "rest ultimately upon... British colonial law and practice" and "[a]s such..
. transcend[ their] immediateAmerican context [and have] considerable significance for Canada");
Catherine Bell, Metis Constitutional Rights in Section 35(1), 36 ALTA. L. REV. 180,210 (1997)
(relying on "early United States decisions applying British colonial laws" to argue that section
35(1) protects "a vast array of rights to land use and governance"); David W. Elliott,Aboriginal
Peoples in Canada and the United States and the Scope of the Special Fiduciary Relationship,
24 MAN. L.J. 137,164 (1996) (justifying the reliance on American jurisprudence to flesh out the
scope and extent of the Crown's fiduciary duty to aboriginal peoples because Canada and the
United States share "[a] common [i]mperial parent' ); Hamar Foster, Forgotten Arguments:
Aboriginal Title and Sovereignty in Canada Jurisdiction Act Cases, 21 MAN. L.J. 343, 363
(1992) (approving the empiricism of the Marshall decisions); Peter W. Hutchins et al., The
AboriginalRight to Self-Government and the Canadian Constitution: The Ghost in the Machine,
29 U.B.C. L. REV. 251, 254, 269 (1995) (citing Worcester v. Georgia, as authority for the
proposition that aboriginal peoples in Canada possess an inherent right of self-government); Patrick
Macklem, First Nations Self-Government and the Borders of the Canadian Legal Imaginati on,
36 McGILL L.. 382, 406-07 (1991 ) [hereinafter Macklem, First Nations] (referring to Johnson
v. M'Intosh's influence on the Canadian law of aboriginal title, and suggesting that Worcester v.
Georgia is preferable); Patrick Macklen, Normative Dim ensions of an Aboriginal Right to Self-
Government, 21 QUEEN's L.J. 173, 187 n.35 (1995) [hereinafter Macklen, Normative
Dimensions] (making the same point); Alan Pratt, Aboriginal Self-Government and the Crown's
FiduciwyDuy: Squaring the Circle or Completing the Circle?, 2 NAT'L J. CoNsT. L. 163,193
(1992) (arguing that Worcester's inference ofthe recognition of inherent rights of self-government
by the treaty-making process applied equally to Canada); Brian Slattery, Aboriginal Sovereignty
and Imperial Claims, 29 OscooDEHALLL.J. 681,701 (1991) (noting that since American courts
have accepted that aboriginal peoples retain a degree of prior sovereignty, "[i]n Canada, [this
conclusion] should come as no great novelty"); Brian Slattery, First Nations and the Constitution:
A Question of Trust, 71 CAN. B. REV. 261,262 (1992) (citing Worcester for a proposition of
Canadian constitutional law); Brian Slattery, The Hidden Constitution: Aboriginal Rights in
Canada, 32 AM. J. COx'. L. 361,366 (1984) (locating the source of the common law doctrine
of aboriginal rights in the Marshall decisions); Brian Slattery, UnderstandingAboriginal Rights,
66 CAN. B. REv. 727, 739 (1987) [hereinafter Slattery, Understanding Aboriginal Rights]
(discussed infra text accompanying notes 255-56); Mark D. Walters, Mohegan Indians v.
Connecticut (1705-1773) and the Legal Status ofAboriginal Customary Laws and Government
in British North America, 33 OsGOODE HALL L.J. 785, 786 (1995) (noting that the Marshall
decisions accepted that "Crown and native sovereignty might have co-existed in British North
American colonies from the British legal perspective"); Jeremy Webber, Relations ofForce and
Relations of Justice: The Emergence bf Normative Community Between Colonists and
AboriginalPeoples, 33 OsGOODE HALL .J. 623,651 (1995) (noting that "[t]he Canadian law of
aboriginal title is directly descended from" the Marshall decisions).
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constitutionalizing those common law rights.2 4' The court has accordingly, and self-
consciously, established an interpretive continuity between those earlier common
law decisions and present constitutional doctrine. For that reason alone, those
decisions require examination.242 Moreover, the Marshall decisions figured
prominently in those earlier decisions as well. Looking past section 35(1) into
Canada's constitutional history, therefore, further highlights how the Marshall
decisions have haunted, and continue to haunt, Canadian constitutional
jurisprudence for over a century.
The starting point for the genealogical use of comparative case law is a family
relationship between two legal systems, one of which is the source of comparative
insight for the other. However, it is possible to imagine two versions of
genealogical argument which differ in their conceptions of a familial relationship,
and as a consequence differ in the strength of the genealogical claims they put forth.
The first-the "strong" genealogical claim-asserts that the two related legal
systems are in fact part of a larger legal order, interpreting and applying the same
set of legal norms that are equally binding in both legal systems. What unites these
jurisdictions and courts is their emergence from a parent legal order that still exists,
and which plays a legally significant role. The decisions of courts in the one
jurisdiction have the same status as those of courts of the same level in the other
jurisdiction. Furthermore, if one court sits atop this transjurisdictional legal order,
its decisions bind all courts below.
The House of Lords and the various "national" courts of appeal in the legal
system of the British Empire exemplify this kind of claim.2 43 The national legal
systems within the Empire were nominally independent of England's courts and
applied their own laws.24 4 However, appeal lay from national courts of appeal (e.g.,
the Supreme Court of Canada, the High Court of Australia, and the Appellate
Division of the South African Supreme Court) to the House of Lords, sitting in its
.capacity as the Privy Council.245 Furthermore, when ruling on legal questions that
arose from one member state of the empire, but which concerned more than one
jurisdiction-for example, the scope of inherent executive powers-the House of
Lords lay down the law for the entire British Empire.246
As this example makes apparent, the strong version of the genealogical claim is
hard to make; somewhat more common is the "weak" genealogical claim that arises
241. Van der Peet v. The Queen [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, 538.
242. Indeed, since they are the source of the legal principles governing the relationship between
the Canadian state and Canada's aboriginal peoples, they can be understood as constitutional
decisions in their own right as well, even though they preceded the entrenchment of section 35(1)
by several decades. At least one ofhese decisions was constitutional in another sense, because the
status of aboriginal rights at common law affected the interpretation of constitutional provisions
governing both the ownership of Crown property and the division of powers. See St Catherine's
Milling & Lumber Co. v. The Queen, 14 App. Cas. 46 (P.C. 1888) (appeal taken from Can.).
243. See generally E.C.S. WADE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: AN OUTLINE OF THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF THE CoNsTrruTIoN, INCLUDING CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNmENT AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AND EMPIRE (4th ed. 1950).
244. See id. at 406-07.
245. See id. at 449.
246. See id.
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among legal systems embodying a different conception of familial relationship.
Specifically, these various national legal orders are related to one another to the
extent that they trace their origins, and the origins of important legal rules, to a
common legal "parent." However, they are legally independent from one another
in a way that the national legal orders in the British Empire were not. This
distinctiveness is clearest when the "parent" legal order no longer exists. As I
discuss below, the use of the Marshall decisions in the Canadian law of aboriginal
rights relies on the weak version of genealogical argument.
The weak version of genealogical interpretation consists of three interpretive
moves. First, the interpreting court makes an ancestral claim-that is, it identifies
a parent legal order that is the source of both its own legal system, and of the system
on whose case law it wishes to rely. Second, that court establishes that both systems
share a common inheritance. In legal terms, this means that both systems share a
legal rule, or a body of legal rules, that originate in the ancestral legal order. Third,
and finally, the claims of ancestry and inheritance combine to establish the prima
facie relevance and the legitimacy of the interpreting court's recourse to
comparative jurisprudence. The development, interpretation, and application of
inherited legal principles in one legal system become directly relevant to the
resolution of concrete legal disputes in the other.
It is worth reflecting on the normative premises underlying genealogical
argumentation. Both the strong and weak versions of genealogical argumentation
are positivist claims. At its core, legal positivism is concerned with the nature of
and the connection between the notions of validity and authority.24 7 Validity, for the
positivist, is what distinguishes legal rules from non-legal rules; it is the criterion
for differentiating law from other realms, such as moral and political philosophy,
which may use similar concepts and terminology (rights, duty, obligation, etc.). The
centrality of validity to the definition of law has led some positivists to construct
legal theories around that notion. H.L.A. Hart, with his "rule of recognition," '248 and
Hans Kelsen, with his "grundnorm," are two famous examples.249 It follows that a
positivist approach to questions of legal validity involves the identification of the
criteria of validity, both within and across legal systems.
Alongside legal validity, a central preoccupation of positivists is the nature of
legal authority.2 0 This general concern usually arises in the context of a specific
question: whether there is a duty to obey the law. Positivists typically address this
issue by sharply distinguishing between the moral and legal dimensions of that
question. They argue that neither dimension has a bearing on the other; the
questions of legal and moral duty are entirely separate. Typically, commentators
have only focused on one half of this argument, emphasizing that morality may
dictate disobedience of the law.2 ' But for the purposes of my discussion, it is
247. My account of legal positivism is drawn from H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 195
(1961), and RAZ, supra note 87.
248. HART, supra note 247, at 92-93.
249. HANS KELSEN, GNRAL THEORY OF LAWAND STATE 29-40 (1945).
250. See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 87, at 28.
251. See, e.g., JOsEPH RAZA Right to Dissent? . CMilDisobedience, in TEE AUTHORrrY OF
LAW, supra note 87, at 262.
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important to emphasize the other half of the positivist view-that is, that questions
of moral obligation should not contaminate the existence of a legal duty to obey the
law. For the positivist, the notion of legal duty only makes sense in light of, and is
in fact a function of, a certain feature of law: its claim to authority. Raz captures the
notion of authority well when he states that "the law claims that the existence of
legal rules is a reason for conforming behaviour," and a "reason[] for disregarding
reasons for non-conformity." '52 Finally, for the positivist, validity and authority are
linked in a fundamentally important way. Law's claim to authority asserts that legal
rules ought to be followed because they are legal rules; the positivist theory of
validity identifies the rules which are the objects of law's claim to authority.
Genealogical interpretation fits the positivist mold. Consider the weak version of
genealogical interpretation, which is most relevant to my argument. The first two
moves in weak genealogical argument, ancestry and inheritance, are claims about
legal validity. They provide criteria for identifying legal rules from one legal system
that can play a role in constitutional interpretation in another. Moreover, the third
move in weak genealogical argument-that the rules so identified are prima facie
relevant to constitutional interpretation-is a claim of legal authority. That is, the
fact that legal rules meet the criteria of ancestry and inheritance, understood in this
context as criteria of validity, is reason enough to follow them.
An important corollary of the fact that genealogical claims are positivist is that
they are capable of being content-independent. Content-independence, for the
positivist, means that criteria of legal validity need not incorporate substantive
principles of political morality. Needless to say, criteria of validity may incorporate
such principles; this is how a positivist would explain the nature and function of a
bill of rights.253 But for weak genealogical interpretation, the criteria of legal
validity are strictly formal; weak genealogical argument, in other words, is content-
independent As I have characterized the moves in weak genealogical interpretation,
none of them make the actual content of the legal rules a condition of the validity
and authority of those rules. Substantive claims are absent from genealogical
argument.
In this respect, genealogical interpretation differs from both universalist and
dialogical interpretation. For universalism, the value of comparative jurisprudence
lies precisely in its appeal to substantive principles of political morality. A foreign
decision is a valuable source of insight in large part because of its substantive
appeal. Thus, it is content-dependent, and for this reason, to a great extent, anti-
positivist in orientation. Dialogical interpretation is also driven by directly engaging
with substantive questions of political morality, but in a different way. Under this
approach, legal rules found in foreign jurisprudence are useful vehicles for
constitutional self-reflection because of the manner in which they reflect and
gesture to factual and normative assumptions that lie underneath black-letter
doctrine. Unlike the case with universalist interpretation, though, here, the
underlying and organizing principles to be found in comparative jurisprudence need
not be substantively appealing. But the process of constitutional self-reflection still
252. RAz, supra note 87, at 30.
253. I take this to be Frederick Schauer's positivist explanation of constitutional interpretation.
Frederick Schauer, ConstitutionalInvocations, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1295 (1997).
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requires a court to make sense of foreign jurisprudence-that is, to explain it in
coherent terms. Genealogical interpretation, by comparison, does not require an
interpreting court to come to a nuanced understanding of the rationales underlying
comparative jurisprudence. Rather, once that case law is identified, its prima facie
relevance is established.
B. Genealogical Arguments in the Canadian Law of
Aboriginal Rights
The genealogical use of American jurisprudence in the Canadian law of
aboriginal rights is aptly summarized and advocated by Brian Slattery:
From its origin in British imperial law, the doctrine of aboriginal rights has
passed into Canadian common law, and, subject to statutory modifications,
operates uniformly across Canada. The doctrine was inherited not only by
Canada but also by the United States after the American Revolution. A series of
decisions written by Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court
in the early nineteenth century review the history of British dealings with native
peoples in America, and articulate certain principles implicit in those dealings.
These decisions... provid[e] structure and coherence.to an untidy and diffuse
body of customary law based on official practice. The Marshall decisions are as
relevant to Canada as they are to the United States ....
This paragraph contains each of the interpretive moves I described above. First,
Slattery asserts that the United States and Canada can both trace their ancestry to
British imperial law ("[firom its origin in British imperial law"). Second, he states
that British imperial law contained legal principles governing aboriginal rights
("the history of British dealings with native peoples in America, and.., certain
principles implicit in those dealings"), and that these principles were "inherited not
only by Canada but also by the United States." Finally, and as a consequence of the
previous two moves, he argues that the identification, interpretation, and
application of those principles by Chief Justice Marshall ("[tlhe Marshall
decisions") is prima facie relevant to the interpretation of the Canadian
Constitution, in particular section 35(1)'s recognition and affirmation of existing
aboriginal rights; indeed, those principles "are as relevant to Canada as they are to
the United States."
255
254. Slattery, UnderstandingAboriginalRights, supra note 240, at 739 (footnotes omitted).
The Supreme Court of Canada approved and adopted Slattery's characterization of the relevance
of the Marshall decisions to the interpretation of section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, in
Van derPeetv. The Queen [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507,541.
255. Slattery, UnderstandingAboriginal Rights, supra note 240, at 739. An additional point
emerges from Slattery's paragraph, when read in light of the jurisprudence we will consider. The
legal principles governing the rights of aboriginal peoples are unwritten. In the Anglo-American
legal imagination, they are therefore principles that exist at common law. For example, the
American version of the law of aboriginal rights imagines Indian nations as being "domestic
dependent sovereigns" with considerable powers of self-government, who deal directly with the
federal government, and who have immunity from the application of state laws. See FELIX S.
CoHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 245-46 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982).
However, neither that phrase, nor the important idea it embodies, are to be found anywhere in the
written text of the United States Constitution. Rather, they are an unwritten part of the
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Slattery's comments show that the genealogical influences of the Marshall
decisions on Canadian constitutional jurisprudence touch on the normative
justification for aboriginal rights. Normative questions are central to the
interpretation of section 35(1), because the determination of what special legal
rights aboriginal peoples have requires a consideration of why they have them. In
this respect, Canadian law has evolved considerably over the last hundred years,
from grounding aboriginal rights in imperial enactments, to justifying them on the
basis of long-standing aboriginal occupation of lands, to basing them in pre-existing
systems of aboriginal social organization, including aboriginal law. This evolution
within Canadian law has been driven by the Marshall decisions. Moreover, the
Marshall decisions present two different justifications for aboriginal rights-prior
occupancy and prior sovereignty-and Canadian jurisprudence has evolved from
relying on the former to the latter.256
C. British Imperial Law and the Acquisition of Territorial
Sovereignty
Genealogical arguments in the Canadian law of aboriginal rights rely on a claim
of ancestry-namely, that the law of aboriginal rights in both Canada and the
United States originates in British imperial law. A full comprehension of those
arguments therefore requires that we understand the relevant principles of British
imperial law.257 The rights of aboriginal peoples under British imperial law
Constitution, that exist alongside the writtee portions of that document It has the same status as
the written provisions, and conditions their interpretation. Indeed, applied to Canada through
genealogical interpretation, the implications are dramatic--North America is cloaked by unwritten
common law rules that originally governed the relations between the British Crown and aboriginal
peoples, and, through inheritance, now constitute part of the constitutional orders of both the
United States and Canada.
256. 1 argue in the passages that followthat the Marshall decisions offer a reinterpretation of the
doctrine of discovery. However, this is not the only way that the decisions have been read. Some
American scholars have taken the position that Johnson and Worcester actually rely on the law of
conquest, not the doctrine of discovery. This, for example, is the view of Felix Cohen. FELIx S.
COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDI4 LAW 123 (1942).
The second way in which the Marshall decisions have influenced the Canadian jurisprudence
on aboriginal rights is in their methodological approach. The Marshall decisions derived the legal
principles governing aboriginal rights from the practice of the British Crown in its dealings with
aboriginal peoples. The Marshall decisions converted those practices, born out of political
compromise, into justiciable rules of law. In so doing, the Marshall decisions are anti-positivist in
their take on legal sources, in the sense that they do not rely on formal sources of law. Although
academic commentators have devoted a great deal of attention to this aspect of the Marshall
decisions, see supra note 240, this aspect has had less of an influence on Canadian aboriginal
rights jurisprudence. I will accordingly not discuss it.
It is important to note that the decisions are positivist in two other senses, though: first, Chief
Justice Marshall's style of adjudication is thoroughly positivist, applying legal doctrine and
eschewing recourse to political or moral principle, and second, the legal principles Chief Justice
Marshall derives from imperial practice are exercises of sovereign political power.
257. I draw this account from Mark Walters, British Imperial Constitutional Law and
Aboriginal Rights: A Comment on Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 17 QuEaN's L.J. 350
(1992), and the sources cited infra notes 260-74.
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developed out of the corpus of legal principles governing the acquisition of new
territories by the British Crown. Those common law principles took shape in the
era of colonization, when European powers extended their control over large parts
of the globe, and accordingly developed under the shadow and influence of
international law governing the same questions. International law drew a
fundamental distinction between two types of territories: inhabited and uninhabited
lands." A territory's classification determined the manner in which a nation could
acquire sovereignty over it. Inhabited territories were presumed to be under the
control of a sovereign power. As a consequence, sovereignty could only change
through conquest or a treaty of cession concluded with that sovereign. Uninhabited
territories, by contrast, were not under the control of a sovereign power.
International law accordingly provided that sovereignty over them could be
acquired through settlement by colonists from the country asserting sovereignty.5 9
The distinction between uninhabited (or settled) lands and inhabited (or
conquered or ceded) lands had a number of important consequences under English
law. Most significantly, it determined which body of legal principles applied in the
new territory. In inhabited lands, notwithstanding the Crown's acquisition of
territorial sovereignty, the pre-existing system of law continued to exist, and rights
under it were generally enforceable in the common law courts. 260 By contrast, since
uninhabited lands had no legal system, the common law, and with it, applicable
Acts of Parliament, were assumed to have entered uninhabited territories with the
first English settler.26'
Under the traditional body of legal principles governing the acquisition of
sovereignty, at the moment of European contact, North America should have been
classified as an inhabited territory, because aboriginal peoples also had highly
developed systems of law and governance through which they exercised sovereignty
over themselves and their territories. However, European powers evaded the
constraints of international law by adopting a new legal principle for the acquisition
of territory in North America: the doctrine of discovery.2 2 Under the doctrine of
discovery, it was possible to deem inhabited lands to be legally vacant, or terra
nullius."3 The precise criteria for invoking this legal fiction, and as a result the
258. See id. at 358-66.
259. See id.
260. Brian Slattery has referred to this as the "doctrine of continuity." SLATrmRY, ANCESTRAL
LANDS, supra note 240, at 10.
261. See Walters, supra note 257, at 359 (citing Privy Council Memorandum of 9th August,
1722,2 P. Wins. 75 (stating that "if there be a now and uninhabited country found out by English
subjects, as the law is the birthright of every subject, so wherever they go, they carry their laws
with them, and therefore such new found country is to be governed by the law of England")). The
classification ofterritory also determined the respective roles of Parliament and the Crown. Under
the English Constitution, legislative power vested with Parliament, not the Crown. See Case of
Proclamations, 77 Eng. Rep. 1352, 1353 (K.B. 1611). This rule continued to apply to settled
territories; however, it was suspended for conquered territories, granting the Crown.legislative
powers which it did not possess in England, including the power to change local laws. See
Campbell v. Hall, 98 Eng. Rep. 848, 895-96 (K.B. 1774).
262. See generallJAMES CRAWFORD, Tim CREATION OF STATES IN NTERNATIONAL LAW 176-
81 (1979) (describing the international status of aboriginal communities).
263. See SLATERY,ANCESTRAL LANDS, supra note 240, at 3.
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scope of its applicability, were unclear and fluid.26 4 What underlays all of these
criteria, and the doctrine of discovery in general, was a belief in the inferiority of
North America's aboriginal peoples.26
The application of the doctrine of discovery to lands claimed by the British
Crown in what is now Canada and the United States had three implications for the
aboriginal peoples of North America. 66 First, by deeming North America to be
legally vacant, the doctrine of discovery denied the existence of aboriginal
sovereignty prior to the acquisition of territorial sovereignty by Britain.267 As a
corollary, Britain acquired sovereignty through mere acts of discovery; conquest or
cession was unnecessary.26 Since aboriginal peoples had governed themselves
prior to the advent of British sovereignty, discovery in effect extinguished that prior
sovereignty. Moreover, discovery vested the Crown with exclusive sovereignty; any
sovereignty that aboriginal peoples possessed "stem[med] from the Crown by way
of delegation."2 69 Second, the logic of terra nullius denied the prior existence of
aboriginal law in North America. Once again, since aboriginal peoples did have
legal systems before European contact, the doctrine had the practical effect of
extinguishing aboriginal law.2" Third, and finally, discovery had the consequence
of denying pre-existing aboriginal land rights, and hence, de facto extinguishing
them.1271 This flowed from the combined operation of the doctrine of discovery and
English property law. 2
264. As Kent McNeil notes, English courts, at different times and in different geographic
contexts, classified territories as terra nullius or uninhabited that were inhabited by hunter-
gatherers or peoples whose level of civilization was considered lower than England's, or whose
local laws were not deemed suitable for English subjects. KEN'r McNEIL, CoMMoN LAW
ABoRiGwNAL TrrL 117-32 (1989).
265. As Patrick Macklein has written, "European powers viewed Indian nations as different
than, and inferior to, themselves, and offered indigenous difference as a reason to treat North
America as vacant land." Patrick Macklem, Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and
Equality ofPeoples, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1311,1358 (1993).
266. In this paragraph, I follow Brian Slattery, The Organic Constitution: Aboriginal Peoples
and the Evolution of Canada, 34 OsGOoDEHALL L.J. 101,103-08 (1996).
267. See id. at 103-04.
268. See id. at 104.
269. Id. at 105.
270. See id at 106-07. It is worth noting that while it would have been possible to distinguish
the acquisition of territorial sovereignty from the status of aboriginal legal systems, the notion of
terra nullius precluded the drawing of such a distinction.
271. See id. at 106.
272. See Patrick Macklem, What's Law Got to Do with It? The Protection ofAboriginal Title
in Canada, 35 OSGOODEHALLL.J. 125,132-34 (1997). The doctrine of discovery extinguished
any land rights that existed under aboriginal law. See id. at 132-33. The resulting legal vacuum
was filled by the English law of property and its central legal fiction, the doctrine of tenures.
According to that doctrine, the Crown of England was deemed in law to be the original occupant
and absolute owner of all lands in England. See id. at 133. The Crown's fictional status as original
proprietor vested it with the authority to grant legal estates; as a consequence, all grants of land,
in theory, originated in Crown grant. See id. Most lands in England, however, could not be traced
to original Crown grants. See id. Therefore, the fiction of original Crown ownership was
accompanied by another that actual occupants at the time of the creation of the doctrine of tenures
held those lands through fictitious grants from the Crown. See id. In North America, however,
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D. "Softening" British Imperial Law and the Doctrine of
Discovery
The dramatic consequences of the doctrine of discovery for aboriginal peoples in
North America have led some scholars to suggest that the doctrine of discovery
should be repudiated by common law courts.' 3 Most common law courts and legal
scholars have resisted this suggestion, though, because it would have dramatic
consequences for the existing patterns of sovereignty and landholding in North
America.' Given the absence of either conquest or treaties for large parts of North
America, Britain may have never acquired sovereignty over many aboriginal
peoples. Instead, jurists generally accept that discovery did vest territorial
sovereignty in the Crown, but focus on mitigating or "softening" the consequences
of discovery by vesting special legal rights in aboriginal peoples, ranging *from
weak rights to occupy land to broad rights of self-governance. What is significant
here is that these differences in degree can be traced to a more fundamental
distinction-the normative justifications they rely on for the notion of aboriginal
rights. Doctrinally, these normative justifications translate into different accounts
of the sources of aboriginal rights.
In the next part, I explore these normative justifications for and sources of
aboriginal rights-imperial enactment, prior occupancy, the continuity of aboriginal
law, and prior sovereignty-as developed by Canadian courts under the influence
of American jurisprudence. Canadian law has undergone a normative evolution in
its conception of the sources of aboriginal rights. Genealogical interpretation,
relying on the Marshall decisions, has played a pivotal role in that evolution. The
Marshall decisions have been influential because they offer an alternative
understanding of British imperial law to the conventional account given above.
although the notion of the Crown as original occupant was held to apply, aboriginal inhabitants
were denied the benefit of the system of fictitious grants that operated in England. See id. Their
lands were considered to be ungranted or legally vacant, and were held absolutely by the Crown.
See id As a consequence, the doctrine of discovery granted the British Crown absolute ownership
over Canada, notwithstanding aboriginal occupation. Macklem aptly describes the combined effect
of these legal doctrines as "Aboriginal territorial dispossession" because those doctrines turned
aboriginal peoples into trespassers on their own lands. Id. at 134.
273. See, e.g., Michael Asch & Patrick Macklem, Aboriginal Rights and Canadian
Sovereignty: An Essay on R. v. Sparrow, 29 ALBERTA L. REV. 498,512-17 (1991); Macklem,
supra note 265, at 1358-59; Macklem, First Nations, supra note 240, at 451.
274. See Regina v. Sparrow [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075,1103; Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat) 543,588-89 (1823).
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E. Aboriginal Rights As Creations of British Imperial Law
1. St. Catherine's Milling
One approach Canadian courts took to "softening" the doctrine of discovery
worked within British imperial law to locate aboriginal rights in imperial
enactments or the common law. The first and easiest method for doing so was to
locate aboriginal rights to land in acts of the sovereign. This method posed a
minimal challenge to'the doctrine of discovery, because it accepted as its premise
both the sovereign and proprietary power of the Crown, and viewed aboriginal
rights as creations or delegations of that power. It is therefore useful to examine the
first method as a point of interpretive departure:
The decision of the Privy Council in St. Catherine's Milling & Lumber Co. v.
The Queen in 1888 relied on this method to recognize aboriginal rights to land in
Canada.275 The dispute in that case centered on the ownership of lands surrendered
through treaty by the Ojibway nation to the government of Canada. The lands were
largely located within the borders of the province of Ontario. 26 Ontario alleged that
on surrender, the lands had passed to the Crown in right of the province; Canada
alleged that they had passed to the Crown in right of Canada. 7
In order to resolve that point, the Privy Council first explained the nature of the
aboriginal interest in these lands prior to surrenderY.2 8 The Privy Council assumed
throughout its judgment that the aboriginal nation had had a legally cognizable
interest in its lands.27 9 However, given the effect of the doctrine of discovery, that
interest could not exist at common law, and, unsurprisingly, the Privy Council did
not address common law arguments at all.2s Instead, it stated that the "only" source
of the aboriginal interest in these lands was the Royal Proclamation of 1763
("Proclamation"). ' The Proclamation was an enactment of the Crown promulgated
at the conclusion of the Seven Years War. 2 It "reserved" to aboriginal nations the
lands that they occupied as "hunting grounds. '283 The Proclamation also imposed
a moratorium on Crown grants to aboriginal lands that had been neither ceded nor
purchased, banned private purchases of Indian lands, and required that any land
275. 14 App. Cas. 46 (P.C. 1888) (appeal taken from Can.).
276. See id. at 52.
277. See id. The answer to that question involved the interpretation of a provision of the
Canadian Constitution which, at the moment of Confederation, had vested title to all public
pmpertyvithin each province in the provincial Crown. See Constitution Act, R.S.C., No. 5, § 109
(1867 Can.).
278. See St Catherine's Milling, 14 App. Cas. at 53-55.
279. See id. passim.
280.See id. at 58.
281. See id. at 54 (discussing the Royal Proclamation of 1763, R.S.C., app. IL No. 1).
282. See id. at 53.
283. Id.
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purchases be made by the Crown at a public meeting of the aboriginal nation
concerned." 4
In sum, the Privy Council in St. Catherine's Milling concluded that the
Proclamation had the effect of creating an aboriginal interest in the lands at issue.
21
Moreover, it held that the Proclamation was the sole source of that interest. In the
Privy Council's words:
Whilst there have been changes in the administrative authority, there has been
no change since the year 1763 in the character of the interest which its Indian
inhabitants had in the lands surrendered by the treaty. Their possession, such as
it was, can only be ascribed to the general provisions made by the royal
proclamation in favour of all Indian tribes then living under the sovereignty
and protection of the British Crown.m
2. Calder
St. Catherine's Milling marked the beginning of the Canadian jurisprudence on
aboriginal title, and therefore, represents the starting point in the normative
evolution of Canadian conceptions of the source of aboriginal rights. In brief, it
made aboriginal rights contingent on the existence of imperial enactment. The limits
of this approach were reached and explored in Calder v. Attorney-General of
British Columbia.28 7 In that appeal, members of the Nishga nation in British
Columbia brought a claim for declarations that they had possessed, since time
immemorial, an aboriginal title to their lands that had not been extinguished since
the advent of Canadian sovereignty.28 The aboriginals' claim challenged the
rationale for aboriginal rights set out in St. Catherine 's Milling.289 The only
imperial enactment which could have grounded a claim to aboriginal title in British
Columbia was the Proclamation.29 However, the geographic reach of the
Proclamation was hotly disputed by the parties, so a finding that the Proclamation
did not extend to British Columbia would have denied the claimants land rights that
aboriginals in other parts of Canada possessed.291' Realizing this limitation, the
claimants invoked a new normative justification for aboriginal title: their historic
occupancy of their lands. 292 Patrick Macklem has termed this argument one of
"prior occupancy," that is, "that aboriginal people possess Aboriginal rights
because they lived on and occupied portions of the North American continent prior
to European contact. '293
This method of softening the doctrine of discovery viewed aboriginal land rights
as creations of the common law, and in particular, of the common law principle that
284. See id. at 53-54.
285. Id. at 55.
286. Id. (each emphasis added).
287. [1973] S.C.R. 313.
288. See id. at 318.
289. See id. at 320-23.
290. See id. at 322.
291. See id. at 323-25.
292. See id. at 328.
293. Macklem, Normative Dimensions, supra note 240, at 180.
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possession is proof of ownership.294 Like the first method (applied in St.
Catherine's Milling), "prior occupancy" accepted the legitimacy of the doctrine of
discovery and the notion that aboriginal rights were creations of the English legal
system. However, because it granted legal significance to the prior presence of
aboriginal peoples, it rejected the doctrine of discovery in its strongest formulation,
and opened up the possibility that other aspects of that prior presence could be
recognized as well.
Both the plurality and dissenting judgments (Justices Judson and Hall,
respectively) agreed that prior occupancy could form the basis of aboriginal title,
although they divided on whether the Nishga's aboriginal title had in fact been
extinguished. Moreover, through genealogical interpretation, they identified the
Marshall decisions as the doctrinal source for grounding aboriginal title in prior
occupancy. Those decisions were taken to be authoritative because they offered an
alternative account of the consequences of discovery under British imperial law.
Justice Judson began his discussion of the Marshall decisions by noting that they
had "strongly influenced" the Canadian courts in St. Catherine s Milling.""5 He then
quoted a lengthy passage from Chief Justice Marshall's judgment in Johnson v.
M'Intosh as representing the law on aboriginal title.296 In that passage, though,
Chief Justice Marshall explained a version of the doctrine of discovery that was
based on, but which differed substantially from, the conventional account offered
by British imperial law. On the one hand, Chief Justice Marshall accepted that
discovery vested both sovereign and proprietary authority in the Crown, which
implicitly relied on the premise that North America was legally vacant. But on the
other hand, Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged the presence of aboriginal peoples
prior to discovery, and accepted that aboriginal peoples possessed rights to land by
virtue of their prior occupation of North America. Thus, in passages quoted by
Justice Judson, Chief Justice Marshall referred to an "Indian title of occupancy"
which survived the discovery of North America.297 However, the existence of Indian
title did not deny the "absolute title of the Crown."29 As a consequence, discovery
vested the Crown with "the absolute title . . . to extinguish" the Indian right;
moreover, the absolute title of the Crown was "incompatible with an absolute and
complete title in the Indians."299
Recognizing the inconsistency between the visions of aboriginal title set forth in
Johnson and in St. Catherine's Milling, Justice Judson reconciled the two decisions
by noting that the Proclamation was not the "exclusive source" of aboriginal title
in Canada; as well, he held that the Proclamation did not apply to the lands in
question." Justice Judson went on to adopt the Marshall theory of aboriginal title
as his own, by holding that "when the settlers came, the Indians were there,
294. See id.
295. See Calder [1973] 1 S.C.R. at 320.
296. See id. at 321.
297. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587 (1823).
298. Id. at 588.
299. Id.
300. Calder [1973] 1 S.C.R. at 322.
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organized in societies and occupying the land as their forefathers had done for
centuries. This is what Indian title means .... "'01
The use of Johnson as an engine of normative evolution for the Canadian law of
aboriginal rights, and the explicit invocation of genealogical interpretation, were
even clearer in Justice Hall's dissent Like Justice Judson, Justice Hall accepted that
the Nishga's historic occupation of their lands was sufficient to give rise to
aboriginal title. Noting the absence of Canadian authority on this point, Justice Hall
drew on a larger body of jurisprudence "affirming common law recognition of
aboriginal rights to possession and enjoyment of lands of aborigines precisely
analogous to the Nishga situation here."3"2
The Marshall decisions played a dominant role in his discussion. Justice Hall
began byjustifying the genealogical use of Johnson, by examining its treatment in
one of the Supreme Court's judgments in St. Catherine's Milling.3 Justice Hall
highlighted one portion of that judgment, which is worth quoting in full:
"TheAmerican authorities ... consist... of several decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States, from which three, Johnston [sic] v. McIntosh,
Worcester v. State of Georgia, and Mitchell v. United States, may be selected
as leading cases. The value and importance of these authorities is not merely
that they show that the same doctrine as that already propounded regarding
the title of the Indians to unsurrendered lands prevails in the United States,
bu4 what is ofvastly greater importance, they without exception refer its origin
to a date anterior to the revolution and recognize it as a continuance of the
principles of law or policy as to Indian titles then established by the British
government, and therefore identical with those which have also continued to
be recognized and applied in British North America."
'
,
3 4
This passage contains each of the three moves of genealogical argumentation. The
claim of ancestry is made by referring the "origin" of Chief Justice Marshall's
judgments "to a date anterior to the revolution" in the law of the British Empire.
Furthermore, there is the claim of inheritance ("a continuance of the principles of
law or policy as to Indian titles then established by the British government").
Finally, and as a consequence, the ancestry and inheritance establish the prima facie
relevance of Chief Justice Marshall's judgments ("therefore identical with those
which have also continued to be recognized and applied in British North
America"). The strength of this genealogical argument was recognized by Justice
Hall himself, who referred to Johnson as "the locus classicus of the principles
governing aboriginal title."3 '
Having made his genealogical claims clear, Justice Hall went on to draw
substantive principles of law from Johnson. Like Justice Judson, he relied on
Johnson for a modified version of the doctrine of discovery that simultaneously
recognized both aboriginal rights to land arising out of historic occupation, and the
ultimate sovereignty and proprietary power of the Crown. After quoting a lengthy
301. Id. at 328 (emphasis added).
302.Id. at 376.
303. See id. at 377-83.
304.Id at 377 (quoting Justice Strong in St Catherine's Milling & Lumber Co. v. The Queen
[1886] 13 S.C.R. 577,610 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original)).
305. Id. at 380 (emphasis in original).
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passage from Johnson, Justice Hall stated that the "dominant and recurring
proposition stated by Chief Justice Marshall in Johnson v. M'Intosh is that on
discovery or conquest the aborigines of newly-found lands were conceded to be the
rightful occupants of the soil with a legal as well as a just claim to retain possession
of it."3"' But despite Justice Hall's reliance on Johnson to soften the consequences
of settlement, his acceptance of Crown sovereignty and, hence, of Crown
proprietary authority is equally clear. This is evident from his endorsement, for
which he cited Johnson as authority, of "the original fundamental principle that
discovery or conquest gave exclusive title to those who made it. '30 7
F. Aboriginal Rights Arising from the Continuity
ofAboriginal Law in Guerin
Read moderately, Johnson represents a weak challenge to the doctrine of
discovery, because it accepted the vesting of proprietary and sovereign authority in
the Crown through discovery, and granted land rights to aboriginals through the
operation of, and according to the principles of, English common law. However,
Johnson's reworking of British imperial law had more radical implications than
these. By opening the door to the judicial recognition of the prior presence of
aboriginal peoples in North America, Johnson raised the questions of which
aspects of that prior presence ought to be recognized, and what the legal
consequences of that recognition ought to be. At the very least, prior to European
contact, aboriginal peoples did not merely physically occupy North America; their
relationships with each other, and with their lands, were governed by systems of law
that varied from nation to nation. Accordingly, another approach to "softening" the
consequences of settlement in Canadian jurisprudence, relying on Johnson, would
be to extend legal recognition to rights under aboriginal law that pre-existed the
assertion of sovereignty by European powers."'
Doctrinally, this strategy consisted of attacking the simple dichotomy drawn by
British imperial law between conquered and settled territories. Recall that for the
conquered territories, the pre-existing system of law continued to exist after the
acquisition of British sovereignty, and the rights under that system were enforceable
in the common law courts, whereas for the settled territories, which were presumed
to have no legal system, the common law and applicable statutes entered the colony
with the first English settler.'" In place of this simple dichotomy, Mark Walters has
suggested that settled territories should have been (and in fact often were) governed
306. Id. at 383. In another significant move, Justice Hall also identified the source of that
proposition in the English common law rule that "[p]ossession is of itself... proof of ownership."
Idr at368. This link between Johnson and the common law rules of property tacitly acknowledged
the settlement thesis, because it located the source of aboriginal land rights in English legal
principles.
307. Id. at 383.
308. Indeed, Johnson itself discussed the passing of title under aboriginal legal systems; one of
the controversial holdings of the case was that title under aboriginal law was unenforceable in
United States courts. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 592-93 (1823).
309. See supra text accompanying notes 259-70.
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by principles of "complex settlement."31 According to this theory, aboriginal
customary law had ongoing legal force in North America after discovery, and
applied among aboriginal peoples inter se, while the common law governed
settlers' internal relations."' The significance of the theory of complex settlement
is that it locates the source of aboriginal rights not in the common law, but in
aboriginal law.
There is little in the way of Canadian case law that unambiguously applies the
theory of complex settlement in its entirety. However, after Calder, the Supreme
Court of Canada in Guerin v. The Queen used Johnson to force the distinction
between the legal principles governing settled and conquered territories.3 1 2 Guerin
turned on the questions of whether the Crown owed a fiduciary duty to aboriginal
peoples because it had accepted a surrender of aboriginal lands, and, if so, what
was the nature of that duty.31 3 In order to explore the latter question, the court
considered the basis of aboriginal title.314
Guerin confirmed that Calder had significantly altered the Canadian law of
aboriginal title by grounding aboriginal title in prior occupation, not imperial
enactment.3 1 ' The court (per Justice Dickson) noted that "[i]n this respect Calder
is consistent with the position of Chief Justice Marshall in the leading American
cases of Johnson v. M'Intosh and Worcester v. State of Georgia."316 However, the
proposition that the court drew out of Johnson in Guerin was significantly different
than the lesson that Justices Judson and Hall took from it in Calder. According to
the court in Guerin, Johnson had held that "the rights of Indians in the lands they
traditionally occupied prior to European colonization both predated and survived
the claims to sovereignty made by the various European nations in the territories
of the North American continent."31 According to this formulation, aboriginal
rights to land existed prior to the assertion of British sovereignty. As a
consequence, they could not have arisen as a creation of the English common law,
because that body of law only entered Canada upon the assertion of sovereignty.
The only alternative source for aboriginal title, then, would be in pre-existing
systems of aboriginal law. It therefore seems that the Supreme Court of Canada
used Johnson to shift the normative basis of aboriginal rights under Canadian law
from prior occupation (and the English common law) in Calder, to aboriginal legal
systems that existed prior to the advent of British sovereignty in Guerin.3 1 1
310. Walters, supra note 257, at 365.
311. See id. at 376.
312. See Guerin v. The Queen [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335,377-78.
313. See id. at 377,383.
314. See id. at 376-82.
315. See id. at 376-77.
316. Id. at 377 (citations omitted).
317. Id. at 377-78 (emphasis added).
318. This interpretation is confirmed by the court's statement in Guerin that Johnson stood for
"[t]he principle that a change in sovereignty over a particular territory does not in general affect
the presumptive title of the inhabitants." Id. at 378. In support, the court cited a decision of the
Privy Council. Amodu Tijani v. Secretary, 2 App. Cas. 399 (P.C. 1921) (appeal taken from
Nigeria). Significantly, that decision stated the principles for conquered, not settled, territory, and
so referred to "presumptive title" under the pre-existing legal regime, not English common law.
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G. Aboriginal Rights Arising from Prior Aboriginal
Sovereignty in Van der Peet?
Once the theory of terra nullius and the doctrine of discovery were softened, and
the prior presence of aboriginal peoples in North America was acknowledged, it
became difficult to limit which aspects of that prior presence merited legal
recognition. Aboriginal laws, even though customary in nature, are created,
interpreted, and applied by aboriginal legal institutions. These institutions are the
means by which aboriginal peoples engage in self-government. Accordingly, it is
a "small step" from applying the doctrine of continuity in Canada to acknowledging
the ongoing existence of aboriginal sovereignty after the assertion of European
sovereignty.31
9
Although the existence of aboriginal sovereignty at the moment of discovery is
not difficult to accept, it is another matter altogether to comprehend that Crown and
native sovereignty may have co-existed after North America had been acquired by
Britain. 2 Johnson seems to preclude this possibility, speaking as it does of the
assertion by European powers of "the ultimate dominion" over North America,
including the power to grant title to aboriginal lands, subject to aboriginal title.32'
Indeed, although the judgment is ambiguous, there is good reason to believe that
Johnson may have even denied pre-existing aboriginal sovereignty, through its
description of '"the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country" as '"ierce savages,
whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the
forest.) 322
However, Johnson was not Chief Justice Marshall's last word on the
constitutional status of aboriginal nations in the United States. Nine years later, in
Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall articulated a dramatically different
version of both the pre-existing social organization of aboriginal nations, and their
political status after discovery.3' He did so in terms that applied not only to the
United States, but across what was formerly British North America. Prior to
European contact, North America's aboriginal peoples were "divided into separate
nations, independent of each other and of the rest of the world, having institutions
of their own, and governing themselves by their own laws."324 Given this reality,
Chief Justice Marshall found it difficult to accept the doctrine of discovery in its
unadulterated form, in which "adventurers, by sailing along the coast, and
occasionally landing on it, acquire for the several governments to whom they
belonged, or by whom they were commissioned, a rightful property in the soil...
Guerin [1984] 2 S.C.R. at407. The factthat the court cited this decision lends further strength to
the view that Guerin used Johnson to force the distinction between settled and conquered
territories.
319. Walters, supra note 257, at 388.
320. See Walters, supra note 240, at 786.
321. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543,584 (1823).
322. Id. at 590.
323. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
324. Id. at 542-43.
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or rightful dominion over the numerous people who occupied it." '' Therefore,
although he accepted the fact of British (and now American) sovereignty, he went
on to qualify it to a significant extent.
Looking at the actual practice of Britain in its colonial dealings, Chief Justice
Marshall concluded that Britain viewed aboriginals as "formidable enemies, or
effective friends," and, as a consequence, did not assert complete sovereignty over
aboriginal nations. 26 Rather, Britain "considered them as nations capable of
maintaining the relations of peace and war; of governing themselves, under her
protection; and she made treaties with them, the obligation of which she
acknowledged."3 7 The relationship of aboriginal nations to the Crown was that of
"a dependent ally, claiming the protection of a powerful friend and neighbour, and
receiving the advantages of that protection, without involving a surrender of their
national character."32
Worcester stands at the opposite end of the spectrum from St. Catherine's
Milling, because it recognizes the co-existence of aboriginal and Crown
sovereignty, regards the sovereignty of aboriginal nations as inherent, not delegated,
and accordingly, views aboriginal sovereignty as the source of a full range of
aboriginal rights, including rights of self-government. It is therefore of considerable
significance that Worcester played a leading role in one of the most important
judgments in which the Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted section 3 5(1) of
the Constitution Act, 1982: Van derPeetv. The Queen.3 29 Although section 35(1)
had been applied in an earlier judgment,33 in Van der Peet, the court addressed
itself to a novel question-namely, how to define the existing aboriginal rights
recognized and affirmed by section 35(1). 331
The court (per Chief Justice Lamer) answered this question by articulating a
theory of why aboriginal peoples possess special rights under the Canadian
Constitution. For Chief Justice Lamer, section 35(1) served two distinct purposes:
[It is] first, the means by which the Constitution recognizes the fact that prior to
the arrival of Europeans in North America the land was already occupied by
distinctive aboriginal societies, and... second, the means by which that prior
occupation is reconciled with the assertion of Crown sovereignty over Canadian
territory.332
These two purposes were fulfilled by defining those rights to reflect the manner in
which aboriginal peoples occupied Canada prior to European contact. On its face,
the judgment would appear to endorse the "prior occupation" model of aboriginal
rights. Certainly, this reading of Van der Peet is supported by the Court's own
325. Id. at 543.
326. Id. at 546.
327. Id. at 548-49.
328. Id. at 552. Elsewhere, Chief Justice Marshall clarified the unique relationship between
aboriginal nations and the United States, stating that aboriginal nations held the unique
constitutional status of "domestic dependent nations." Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
329. [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507.
330. See Regina v. Sparrow [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
331. Van derPeet [1996] 2 S.C.R. at 526-27.
332. Id. at 548.
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statement that its approach to the interpretation of section 3 5(1) drew upon both of
the judgments in Calder and Johnson itself.333 However, the court was careful to
explain that the prior occupation of Canada by aboriginal peoples had two distinct
aspects, not only "the prior occupation of land" but also "from the prior social
organization and distinctive cultures of aboriginal peoples on that land." '334
The court drew the latter dimension of aboriginal peoples' prior presence-that
is, their prior social organization-from the judgments of Chief Justice Marshall.
As the Van derPeet court said, "The view of aboriginal rights as based in the prior
occupation of North America by distinctive aboriginal societies, finds support in
the early American decisions of Marshall C.J."33 5 The court prefaced its discussion
of the Marshall decisions by making a genealogical claim. It cited Brian Slattery's
work with approval, and expressly agreed with his statements that the Marshall
decisions provided "'structure and coherence to an untidy and diffuse body of
customary law based on official practice"' and were "'as relevant to Canada as they
are to the United States."' 336 The court went on to discuss both Johnson and
Worcester in some detail. In particular, it quoted and highlighted the following
passage from Worcester:
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent
political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed
possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception of that
imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse with any
other European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular
region claimed.337
The court explained the significance of this passage for the interpretation of the
Canadian Constitution in the following way:
[Chief Justice Marshall]'s essential insight that the claims of the Cherokee must
be analyzed in light of their pre-existing occupation and use of the land-their
"undisputed" possession of the soil "from time immemorial"--is as relevant for
the identification of the interests s[ection] 35(1) was intended to protect as it was
for the adjudication of Worcester's claim.33
This statement should be read in light of both the highlighted passage from
Worcester, and the Court's expanded understanding of the nature of the prior
presence of aboriginal peoples in Canada. By referring to the "pre-existing
occupation and use of the land" in Worcester, the court in fact gestured to the
presence of "distinct, independent political communities" as an aspect of aboriginal
peoples' prior occupation that deserved constitutional protection.339
333. See id. at 539-41.
334. Id. at 562 (emphasis added).
335. Id. at 540 (emphasis added).
336. IaR at 541 (quoting Slattery, UnderstandingAboriginalRights, supra note 240, at 739).
337. Id. at 544 (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832) (emphasis
omitted)).
338. Id. (quoting Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559).
339. Id. The significance of the court's use of Worcester in Van der Peet to expand its
understanding of the prior presence of aboriginal peoples in Canada becomes clear when one
examines the Van der Peet court's test for defining aboriginal rights. The court stated that section
35(1) protected the "crucial elements of those pre-existing distinctive societies," which it defined
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However, despite Worcester's influence, it is clear that the court does not believe
that section 35(1) protects the kind of broad, inherent right of self-government
encompassed by the notion of the domestic dependent nation in U.S. constitutional
law. In a companion judgment handed down with Van der Peet, the court rejected
a claim by an aboriginal nation that section 35(1) protected a "broad right to
manage the use of their reserve lands," because that claim lacked the requisite
specificity to be an aboriginal right.34 The implication of that judgment is that
jurisdiction over specific subject matters will fall to be determined on a case-by-
case basis. Nevertheless, the prospect that section 35(1) could embrace self-
government at all represents a considerable departure from the early days of
Canadian aboriginal rights jurisprudence.34'
VI. CONCLUSION: A PRELIINARY AssEssmENT
A. Introduction
In this Article, I outlined the various ways in which comparative case law is used
in constitutional adjudication. By examining the case law of the Constitutional
Court of South Africa and the Supreme Court of Canada, I demonstrated that
comparative jurisprudence is used in three different ways. These interpretive modes
are universalist, dialogical, and genealogical interpretation. For each, I identified
both the interpretive methodologies employed by courts and the normative premises
underlying those methodologies. I illustrated these points through the use of
concrete examples of decisions in which comparative materials have played an
important role.
At the outset, I stated that this Article itself has a normative premise. My
motivation for engaging.in this study is that courts, because of their central role in
legitimizing and validating the exercise of public power, are under an obligation to
engage in a process of justification for their own decisions. That obligation extends
in terms ofthe "practices, traditions and customs central to the aboriginal societies that existed in
North America priorto contact with the Europeans." Id. at 548. Although the court did make this
point explicitly, its formulation of aboriginal rights had the effect of constitutionalizing incidents
ofaboriginal sovereignty. Underthe rubric of "practices, traditions and customs," for example, the
court included 'raditional laws." Id. at 546. As well, the court quoted with approval a description
of aboriginal rights as concerned with the "customary laws" and "political institutions" of
aboriginal peoples. Id. at 547 (quoting Slattery, UnderstandingAboriginal Rights, supra note
240, at 737). Indeed, the court's definition of aboriginal rights may be capacious enough to
encompass aboriginal laws, and perhaps even governmental institutions, although the proof of
rights must proceed on a case-by-case basis.
340. Regina v. Pamajewon [1996] 2 S.C.R.,821, 834.
341. Van der Peet's holding on the nature of claims for self-government under section 35(1)
must now be reconsidered in light of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010. InDelgamuukw, the court held that
section 35(1) affords constitutional protection to aboriginal title (roughly analogous to Indian title
in the United States), and thatitle encompasses the right to determine to what use title lands could
be put. See id. at 1015-17. The jurisdictional incidents of aboriginal title amount, in effect, to a
right to self-government, albeit with respect to a somewhat limited range of subject matters.
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to courts' interpretive methodologies, because those methodologies define the
institutional identity of courts. Accordingly, having identified and elucidated three
different modes of comparative constitutional interpretation, the task at hand is to
offer a preliminary assessment of them.
The different methods of comparative constitutional interpretation can be
assessed along three different dimensions. The first dimension is their scope-that
is, the range of legal issues and contexts in which they can be used. The second is
the effect of the interpretive mode on the constitutional culture of the jurisdiction
of the interpreting court. The third, and final, dimension is the legitimacy of the
normative claims that each methodology entails.
B. Scope
The different modes of comparative constitutional interpretation vary
considerably in scope. Genealogical interpretation,342 for example-even the weak
version-is confined to a narrow set of legal contexts. Both the legal system of the
interpreting court, and the system that is the source of comparative insight, must
exist in a familial relationship-that is, they must both originate in a parent legal
order. Moreover, the claim of ancestry cannot stand alone; the weak version of
genealogical interpretation also requires a common inheritance. Even for the weak
version, these relationships rarely exist. Also, since genealogical interpretation is
premised on historical relationships, it requires the interpreting court to engage in
the difficult task of establishing the existence of that relationship. In the case of the
Canadian use of American jurisprudence on the constitutional status of Indian
nations, the courts have been assisted greatly by a large body of academic
commentary devoted to making these genealogical claims. 43 Other courts, however,
may find that they need to do this time-consuming work themselves (and as a
consequence may not bother).
The scope of genealogical interpretation is subject to another constraint: the
historical relationships it relies on must be plausible. In this respect, although the
Marshall decisions have played an important role in the Canadian law on aboriginal
rights, their use in that context is somewhat bizarre. The use of the Marshall
decisions relies on the premise that both the American and Canadian legal systems
emerged from the legal order of the British Empire. The difficulty with this
proposition, however, is that America and Canada emerged from the British
imperial order in two radically different ways. America was born out of a revolution
against British imperial rule, and American constitutionalism was, in large part,
formulated as a decisive rejection of key aspects of British constitutionalism. Thus,
in the place of an unwritten constitution, a supreme Parliament, a unitary state, and
the sovereignty of the Crown, the United States opted for a written constitution,
justiciable limits on legislative authority, federalism, and the belief that the people
were ultimately sovereign. Canada's relationship to British imperial law, by
contrast, is one of evolution, not revolution. The various enactments which make
up the Canadian Constitution are Acts of the British Parliament. Moreover, the
342. See discussion supra Part 3.D.3.
343. See articles cited supra note 240.
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Canadian Constitution maintained many aspects of British constitutionalism.
Notwithstanding that Canada is a federal state, and has constitutionally entrenched
fundamental human rights, Canadian constitutional law has been marked by a
commitment to Parliamentary democracy on the Westminster model and the absence
of a strict separation of powers. In light of the different relationships between the
American and Canadian Constitutions, on the one hand, and the British Imperial
order, on the other, genealogical arguments ring a bit hollow. Perhaps for this
reason, some Canadian scholars, though they gesture to the genealogical influence
on Canadian law of the Marshall decisions, rely on those decisions primarily for
their substantive reasoning, without making genealogical claims themselves.344 The
role of the Marshall decisions in Canadian constitutional law thus illustrates how
the scope of genealogical argumentation may be quite narrow.
Universalist interpretation,345 by comparison, applies to a much broader set of
circumstances. Unlike genealogical interpretation, in which the use of comparative
jurisprudence is premised on the existence of a plausible historical relationship,
universalist insights may be garnered from any legal system. The only requirement
is that the system that is the source of comparative insight share a particular
constitutional provision. Typically, that provision guarantees a fundamental human
right. This is largely a function of the fact that the globalization of the practice of
modern constitutionalism has principally involved the spread of the notion that
individual rights should be legally protected against executive and legislative
encroachment. The South African cases discussed above bear out this hypothesis:
universalist interpretation has generally involved the interpretation of the South
African Bill of Rights.
The scope of universalist interpretation is subject to "plausibility constraints" of
its own, however. Universalist interpretation relies on strong normative claims, a
point I will return to shortly. Taking these claims as given, they would appear to
limit the rights with respect to which universalist interpretation can be invoked to
those rights that are truly "universal." The most "universal" of human rights are
those which affect the physical security of the individual. The right to life falls into
this category, as do the rights to security of the person and physical liberty.
However, so do many of the rights that attach to accused persons in the criminal
process, because a criminal conviction permits the state to deprive a person of
liberty and security of the person (and perhaps of life itself). This would explain the
Constitutional Court of South Africa's reliance on foreign case law in this area. By
contrast, even the traditional liberal freedoms (such as expression, religion and
conscience, association, and assembly), although enshrined by many constitutions,
are more normatively contentious. Though courts of various jurisdictions agree on
the importance of these rights, they have differed sharply on their interpretation.346
344. PatrickMacklem is foremost in this regard. See Macklem, supra note 265; Macklem, First
Nations, supra note 240; Macklem, Normative Dimensions, supra note 240.
345. See discussion supra Part ILD.1.
346. The most prominent disagreement has centered over the interpretation of constitutional
guarantees of freedom of expression. Compare, for example, the Canadian and American
jurisprudence on freedom of expression. Although Canadian courts have upheld laws which have
criminalized the production and distribution of pornography, see Regina v. Butler [1992] 1 S.C.R.
452, and hate speech, see Regina v. Keegstra [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, American courts have struck
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In the face of such normative diversity, universalist (or even transcendent)
arguments become difficult to make.
Dialogical interpretation347 has the broadest scope of application. It does not
require the existence of a historical relationship, unlike genealogical interpretation.
More significantly, it does not require the kind of normative consensus across
jurisdictions that universalist interpretation does. Indeed, far from being an obstacle
to the use of comparative jurisprudence, normative disagreement drives dialogical
interpretation, because it forces courts to identify and justify the sources of that
disagreement as a means to developing a sharper awareness of constitutional
similarity and difference. For dialogical interpretation to be possible, then, there
need only exist corresponding constitutional provisions and jurisprudence in two
or more jurisdictions.
C. Constitutional Culture
A court's choice of interpretive methodology will affect more than the outcome
of the particular case before it. It will also likely affect the broader constitutional
culture of the interpreting court's jurisdiction. These effects may also drive the
decision of how to use comparative case law, and are therefore important to assess
as well.
Universalist interpretation,348 in general, will internationalize a nation's
constitutional culture. The constant use of foreign jurisprudence will serve to
remind not only courts, but other actors in the legal system as well-governments,
legal counsel, and private litigants-that a nation's particular constitutional
guarantees are shared with other countries. This effect flows as a consequence of
one of the normative premises of universalist interpretation: that legal principles are
transcendent. Universalist interpretation by courts will work that assumption into
the domestic constitutional psyche, so that it becomes part of the culture of
constitutional argument.
The potential of universalist interpretation to internationalize a nation's
constitutional culture raises the question of why a court may wish to achieve this
objective. One answer is that judges do not self-consciously pursue this goal; rather,
it is only an incidental effect of a genuine commitment to the normative premises
underlying universalist methodology. A more realistic answer is that judges view
the use of foreign jurisprudence as a means for their country to affirm its
membership in, or to rejoin, the mainstream of international society. As I mentioned
above, a number of South African judges have explicitly invoked this goal.3 49
Interestingly, for these judges, the intended audience of comparative constitutional
interpretation is not only the domestic, but also the international, legal community.
down similar laws, see R.A.V. v. City of St Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down municipal
ordinance prohibiting hate speech), American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir.
1985) (striking down the McKinnon-Dworkin anti-pornography ordinance), aff'd mem., 475 U.S.
1001 (1986).
347. See discussion supra Part ll.D.2.
348. See discussion supra Part ll.D.1.
349. See cases cited supra notes 112-14.
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Another reason why judges may wish to internationalize domestic legal culture is
to reform, revitalize, and reinvigorate it. In South Africa, apartheid operated
through the law, and had, therefore, undermined the legitimacy of South African law
and legal institutions. In this light, the Constitutional Court's use of comparative
jurisprudence through universalist interpretation can be viewed as a means to build
a new foundation for South African law in the post-apartheid era."'
Genealogical interpretation35 ' has quite a different set of cultural effects. Like
universalist interpretation, it unshackles a legal system from a narrow parochialism,
and makes explicit the features it shares with other jurisdictions. However, these
connections are not based on present commitments to shared normative premises.
Rather, they flow from the distant past. Thus, instead of serving as a means to
forging a new beginning, genealogical interpretation demands that a court
remember where its legal system has been. The increased awareness of historical
relationships fostered by genealogical interpretation accordingly helps to foster,
within a constitutional culture, a sense of its own history.
The increased sense of history brought about by genealogical interpretation, has,
for example, had a profound effect on the Canadian law of aboriginal rights. It has
forced Canadian courts to face the racist premises of British imperial law, and to
search for alternative formulations of those legal principles that are more just
toward aboriginal peoples. Canadian courts have found an answer in the Marshall
decisions. However, relying on the Marshall decisions raises new questions which
Canadian courts have yet to even ask. The Marshall decisions, especially
Worcester, gesture to a set of historical commitments made by the British Crown
to aboriginal peoples across North America to respect their land rights and rights
of self-governance. The use of the Marshall decisions by the Supreme Court of
Canada, juxtaposed against the historic failure of the Canadian state to recognize
aboriginal self-government, has accordingly helped to revive claims by aboriginal
peoples of breached promises. 35
2
The impact of dialogical interpretation35 3 on domestic constitutional culture is
more difficult to assess. Comparative law is a tool for identifying and justifying the
premises, both factual and normative, underlying one's own legal order. If those
premises differ from those in a foreign jurisdiction, then dialogical interpretation
350. It is particularly telling that foreign case law has been used extensively to interpret the rights
of accused persons in the criminal process, given that in the apartheid era, the criminal law was
used as an instrument of oppression against those who resisted the South African government, and
that the criminal justice system often failed to protect the rights of the accused. See generally
DYzENHAUs,supra note 133.
351. See discussion supra Part lII.D.3.
352. The most prominent example of claims for extensive rights of aboriginal self-government
framed in terms of breached promises can be found in the report of the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples, a commission constituted by the Government of Canada to examine the past,
present, and future relationship between Canada's aboriginal peoples and Canadian society at large.
1-5 REPORT OF T ROYAL CoMIssIoN ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES (1996). The report opens -with
the argument that "[j]ustice demands.., that the terms of the original agreements under which
some Aboriginal peoples agreed to become part of Canada be upheld. Promises ought to be kept.
Undertakings ought to be fulfilled. Solemn commitments ought to be honoured." 1 id. at xxiii.
353. See discussion supra Part ILD.2.
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will have created an increased awareness of constitutional difference. If those
premises are shared, dialogical interpretation will have brought constitutional
similarities to light. The use of comparative jurisprudence will create an awareness
that the legal issues facing a country's courts are not unique. In either case,
comparative jurisprudence will have brought about a deeper understanding of one's
own legal system.35 4
Dialogical interpretation allows a court to use comparative case law without
internationalizing its domestic constitutional culture. It enables a court to learn from
foreign experience without assimilating its constitutional jurisprudence into a larger
transnational conversation about rights and democracy. This is clearest when
comparative jurisprudence leads to a heightened awareness of constitutional
difference. But it is also the case when dialogical interpretation fosters an
awareness of constitutional similarities. In State v. Solberg, for example, Justice
Sachs relied on Justice O'Connor's decision in Lynch v. Donnelly to identify the
premises underlying the South African Bill of Rights.355 He did not make the
additional claim, though, that those premises were transcendent; rather, he used the
American jurisprudence to come to a better understanding of South African
constitutional principles.
D. Legitimacy
Finally, I consider the legitimacy of the normative claims each methodology
entails. Universalist interpretation35 6 is premised on extremely strong normative
claims. It asserts that the law is best understood as a body of principles rather than
rules, and invites a style of adjudication that is openly normative in character. It
nevertheless draws a line between legal principles and philosophical or political
principles. Most controversially, it claims that these moral principles are
transcendent-that is, they are shared by more than one legal system.
Transcendence is the linchpin of universalist interpretation, because it justifies
the use of comparative case law without regard to national boundaries. It is
important to reiterate, though, that transcendence represents more than just an
empirical claim that legal principles tend to be shared by many legal systems.
Rather, it turns this empirical observation into the premise of an argument for a
normative conclusion: that the presence of a legal principle in many legal systems
is evidence of its truth or correctness. Empirical convergence, in other words, is
proof of moral truth.
Thus explained, universalist interpretation becomes open to criticism on the
ground of cultural relativism. The central argument of relativists is that "moral and
354. For a similar view ofthe effects of comparative history, see GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE
COXARATV IMAGINATION: ON THE HISTORY OF RAcIsM, NATIONALISM, AND SOCIAL
MovE,1ENTs 65 (1997) ("Cross-national comparative history can undermine two contrary but
equally damaging presuppositions-the illusion of total regularity and that of absolute
uniqueness.").
355. State v. Solberg, 1997 (4) SALR 1176, 1221 (CC) (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668,687-88 (1984)).
356. See discussion supra Part ll.D.1.
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political values are relative to specific cultural contexts."357 On this view, claims
of universality, or transcendence, are merely a means by which a powerful group
universalizes its particular values."' Cultural relativism underlies the views of legal
particularists who are extremely skeptical about the prospects of constitutional
transplants.
As Patrick Macklein has convincingly demonstrated, the debate between cultural
relativism and universalism is complex,359 and, more importantly, "shows no sign
of abating in the near future."36 This has led Macklem to suggest that normative
arguments for legal rights that rest on relativist premises are inherently unstable. 6'
But it follows, as a corollary, that universalist arguments are unstable as well. As
a result, the legitimacy of universalist interpretation will constantly be put in
question. This poses the additional danger that universalist methodology may in fact
corrode the legitimacy of constitutional interpretation itself.
Genealogical interpretation362 is free from many of the difficulties that plague
universalist interpretation. As I have argued above, genealogical claims are
positivist. A defining feature of legal positivism is that it allows a distinction
between questions of validity and authority, on the one hand, and the substantive
content of legal rules, on the other. Positivism, in other words, is content-
independent. In the context of comparative constitutional interpretation, this is a
source of considerable strength. Positivism establishes the legal relevance of
foreign law to domestic constitutional interpretation without recourse to a larger
moral theory about the truth or rightness of comparative sources.
But, the positivist nature of genealogical interpretation creates legitimacy
problems of its own. Positivist claims are strongest when they operate within an
established legal system that has clearly identified and publicly recognized
principles of legal validity. At a normative level, those principles acknowledge the
legitimacy of structures of governmental power within a political community; the
legitimacy of those structures is also the basis of law's authority. When applied to
foreign sources, however, positivist arguments lose their normative force. The
structures of governmental power that are the sources of comparative jurisprudence
cannot command legitimacy, precisely because they are located outside a political
and legal order. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that genealogical
357. Macklem, supra note 265, at 1335.
358. Iris Marion Young makes this argument IRIs MARION YOUNG, Jusncn AND THE PoLmcs
oFDFFERENCE 59-60 (1990). Ronald Dworkin, for example, makes a universalist argument that
advances particular values when he writes that "[flreedom of speech, conceived and protected as
afundamental negative liberty, is the core of the choice modem democracies have made, a choice
we must now honor in finding our own ways to combat the shaming inequalities women still
suffer." DwoKnm, supra note 52, at 221. Dworkin's categorical statement fails to acknowledge,
for example, that courts in liberal democracies like Canada have in effect given priority to the
eradication ofwomen's inequality over freedom of expression, by upholding the constitutionality
of legislation criminalizing the production, sale, and distribution of pornography. See Regina v.
Butler [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452.
359. See Macklem, supra note 265, at 1335-45.
360. Id. at 1344.
361.Id.
362. See discussion supra Part ll.D.3.
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interpretation is historically oriented, and looks to the distant past as a source of
positive law for the present. Genealogical interpretation must explain why the past
commands of a sovereign should command obedience today.
The fact that positivist approaches to comparative constitutional interpretation
raise serious problems of legitimacy has important implications for genealogical
interpretation. It suggests that courts working in the genealogical mode will anchor
the legitimacy of their recourse to comparative sources by implicitly turning to
normative justifications for comparative constitutional interpretation other than
positivist ones. My suspicion is that courts will not look to foreign jurisprudence
with which they disagree on a substantive level. The image of comparative
constitutional interpretation which emerges is one where public claims of validity
and authority are asserted when comparative jurisprudence is attractive
jurisprudence, whereas secret or private reasons remain unarticulated when
comparative case law is unconvincing and is disregarded. In Patrick Glenn's
felicitous phrase, comparative law "attracts adherence as opposed to obliging it."" 3
Dialogical interpretation364 probably wins on the dimension of legitimacy,
because it makes no normative claims regarding comparative jurisprudence. It uses
comparative case law instrumentally, as a means to stimulate constitutional self-
reflection. Thus understood, dialogical interpretation is more a legal technique than
a theory of constitutional interpretation. Comparative materials are not asserted to
be true or right; rather, they reflect a particular way of articulating underlying
values and assumptions. Moreover, comparative materials are neither valid nor
authoritative in the positivist sense. They need only be authoritative and valid for
the system which is the source of comparative insight.
E. Conclusion: The Beginning of a Constitutional
Conversation
This preliminary assessment of the three modes of comparative constitutional
interpretation illustrates what is at stake when comparative jurisprudence is used
in constitutional adjudication. This discussion offers courts the interpretive
resources to explain why comparative law should count. The task at hand is for
courts, lawyers, and legal scholars to continue this constitutional conversation and
decide whether they are willing to accept the scope, legitimacy, and effects on
constitutional culture of the three different interpretive modes. It is my hope that
this Article will in some way enable that conversation to begin in earnest.
363. Glenn, supra note 111, at 263.
364. See discussion supra Part 3.D.2.
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